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BACKING OFF BIVENS AND THE 
RAMIFICATIONS OF THIS RETREAT FOR 




In 1983 the United States Supreme Court decided two cases that 
together constitute a significant retrenchment from the Court's previ-
ous position in the Bivens1 line of cases. In these two newest cases, 
Chappell v. Wallace 2 and Bush v. Lucas, 3 the Supreme Court substan-
tially raised the barriers to federal court recognition of certain causes 
of action for money damages arising directly under the Constitution. 
The Court did so without acknowledging that this was the purpose or 
effect of its line of reasoning, and without proffering any cogent expla-
nation or justification for this change in the law. Additionally, the 
Court wrote opinions in these two cases that provide no guidance to 
lower federal courts on the critical question of how the constitutional 
adequacy of congressional remedial schemes is to be judged. 
In Part I of this Article, Chappell and Bush are analyzed against 
the backdrop of the preceding Bivens cases. The analysis explains how 
these cases presented situations that were similar to one another but 
unlike any the Supreme Court previously had faced in Bivens cases. It 
demonstrates how the Court departed from the line of analysis that its 
previous Bivens cases had established, in a way that makes it more 
difficult for at least some plaintiffs seeking vindication of their consti-
tutional rights to succeed in having a money damage remedy implied 
directly under the Constitution. The Article then argues that this rais-
ing of the barriers to recovery under the Constitution was not convinc-
t I would particularly like to thank my colleague, Margaret Stewart, for her substantial 
assistance in helping me think through parts of this Article. I would also like to thank my 
colleague, Stuart Deutsch, for his suggestions and Shelby Keisman and Debbie Nutley, students 
at 1.1.T. Chicago-Kent College of Law, for their research assistance in the preparation of this 
Article. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent College of 
Law. A.B. 1969, University of Rochester; J.D. 1973, Harvard University. - Ed. 
1. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
2. 103 s. Ct. 2362 (1983). 
3. 103 s. Ct. 2404 (1983). 
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ingly supported, and enhanced the risk that the constitutional rights of 
some people, in some circumstances, will be so unenforceable as to 
violate constitutional minima. In conjunction with this analysis of 
Chappell and Bush, the Article explores the constitutional theory that 
underlies Bivens actions. It suggests some specific questions courts 
ought to address when faced with the issue of whether a legislated 
remedial scheme should preclude a Bivens remedy. In particular, the 
Article proposes several matters courts ought to examine when judg-
ing whether a legislated remedial scheme is constitutionally adequate. 
Part II argues in favor of a money damage remedy under the Con-
stitution for violations of first amendment rights. A number of Bivens 
actions brought under the first amendment to the Constitution4 are 
then discussed to illustrate the possible implications of Chappell and 
Bush. The discussion shows how these recent Supreme Court deci-
sions increase the risk that first amendment rights will be under-en-
forceable, even unconstitutionally so. Finally, the Article identifies 
first amendment Bivens cases which remain largely unaffected by 
Chappell and Bush. 
I. THE PROBLEMS WITH BUSH AND CHAPPELL 
To understand how Chappell v. Wallace and Bush v. Lucas devi-
ated from the Court's previously formulated analysis for determining 
when a cause of action for money daniages should be recognized to 
arise directly under the Constitution, and, in so deviating, endangered 
certain constitutional rights, one must first understand the Bivens line 
of cases which crune before. A sketch of those cases follows. 
A. The Earlier Supreme Court Cases 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics 5 the Supreme Court was invited to hold that the fourth amend-
ment to the Constitution operates merely to define a defense which 
federal agents can assert to a state law tort suit. 6 The Court rejected 
4. The shorthand phrase, "first amendment Bivens actions," will be used to refer to actions 
for money damages, alone.or in conjunction with other forms of relief, brought directly under the 
first amendment to the Constitution against federal officials. Bivens actions are distinct from 
statutorily authorized actions for money damages for violation of the first amendment. E.g., 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1976) (authorizing actions to be brought against 
the United States itself); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981) (authorizing actions to be brought 
against "persons" including cities, counties and other local government entities and local govern· 
ment officials sued in their official capacities, but excluding states and their agents). 
5. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
6. The proposed defense would have shielded federal agents from state tort liability if the 
challenged search and seizure was reasonable under fourth amendment standards. 403 U.S. at 
390-92, 394. 
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this restrictive view, emphasizing that the fourth amendment circum-
scribes federal power regardless of whether a state, through its tort 
law, would prohibit or penalize the identical act if engaged in by a 
private citizen.7 In support of this conclusion, the Court noted that 
the interests protected by state laws may not be the same as those 
protected by the fourth amendment's guarantees, and may even be in-
consistent with or hostile to the interests protected by the fourth 
amendment. 8 Because the enforcement of a constitutional guarantee is 
a federal matter, not appropriately left to the states to safeguard, the 
Court determined that "an independent claim [is] both necessary and 
sufficient to make out the plaintiff's cause of action."9 
The Court marshalled several justifications for its decision that 
money damages are and should be recoverable for injuries caused by a 
federal violation of the fourth amendment. The Court expressly re-
jected respondents' formulation of the question presented as whether 
the availability of money damages is necessary to enforce the fourth 
amendment. It restated the issue as merely whether petitioner, if he 
could demonstrate the injury alleged, was entitled to redress through a 
remedial mechanism normally available in the federal courts.10 The 
Court noted that damages historically have been the ordinary remedy 
for an invasion of personal interests in liberty, and relied upon the 
notion that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies to grant appro-
priate relief when federally protected rights have been invaded.11 The 
Court also analogized from the then-accepted principle that federal 
courts may use any available remedy where legal rights have been in-
vaded and a federal statute provides a general right to sue.12 Finally, 
it noted that "we have here no explicit congressional declaration that 
persons [so] injured ... may. not recover money damages from the 
agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effec-
tive in the view of Congress,"13 and remarked, "The present case in-
volves no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress."14 The Court suggested that such spe-
7. 403 U.S. at 392-94; accord 403 U.S. at 400-02 n.3 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
8. 403 U.S. at 394-95. 
9. 403 U.S. at 395. 
10. 403 U.S. at 397. 
11. 403 U.S. at 395-96. 
12. 403 U.S. at 392, 396. In recent years the Court has become less willing to imply private 
causes of action from statutes. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 
U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); see also Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
13. 403 U.S. at 397. 
14. 403 U.S. at 396. 
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cial factors may be present when questions of federal fiscal policy are 
involved. 15 On this analysis, the Court reversed the dismissal of Biv-
ens' complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be 
granted. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan agreed that federal courts 
do have the power to award money damages for violations of constitu-
tionally protected interests even without congressional action creating 
a cause of action for damages. He further agreed that damages were 
appropriate to the vindication of the personal interests protected by 
the fourth amendment, rejecting the government's position that a 
damage remedy should be accorded only where it is "indispensable" to 
vindicate constitutional rights. 16 In arriving at the conclusion that a 
damage remedy was appropriate to vindicate Bivens' injury, Justice 
Harlan went beyond the Court's pronouncements to set forth criteria 
to govern the exercise of a court's power. In this influential part of his 
concurrence, Justice Harlan observed that a court could take into ac-
count all of the policy considerations that a legislature would consider 
in fashioning a statutory remedy, and more. Thus, the presence or 
absence of deterrent effects on future official lawlessness would not be 
determinative.17 He noted that courts are "capable of making the 
types of judgment concerning causation and magnitude of injury nec-
essary to accord meaningful compensation"18 for violation of fourth 
amendment rights, while opining that this might not be true with re-
spect to other constitutionally protected interests. 19 Justice Harlan 
also deemed it noteworthy that money damages were the only possible 
remedy for someone in Bivens' position.20 Last, he met the suggestion 
that implication of a damages remedy would strain an already over-
taxed federal judiciary21 by arguing that mere "budgetary inadequa-
cies should not be permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of 
otherwise sound constitutional principles."22 
15. For discussion of what else the Court may have had in mind, see text at notes 32, 117-22 
infra. 
16. 403 U.S. at 399-411. 
17. 403 U.S. at 407-08. 
18. 403 U.S. at 409. 
19. Justice Harlan here cited his concurring opinion in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 
n.S (1961) ("There may be no damage remedy for the loss of voting rights or for the harm from 
psychological coercion leading to a confession. And what is the dollar value of the right to go to 
unsegregated schools?"). 
20. 403 U.S. at 409-10. 
21. 403 U.S. at 428-29 (Black, J., dissenting); cf. 403 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(an "avalanche of new federal cases" will "stultify proper law enforcement"). 
22. 403 U.S. at 411. The dissenting Justices questioned the efficiency and wisdom of the 
damage remedy created by the majority, 403 U.S. at 421-22 (Burger, C.J.), 428-30, (Black, J.) 
and (especially Justice Black) argued that the holding in Bivens impinged on legislative and pol· 
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In the next major case in the Bivens line, 23 Davis v. Passman, 24 the 
Court held that a cause of action and a damages remedy can be im-
plied directly from the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Ms. 
Davis had been a deputy administrative assistant to a U.S. Congress-
man. She claimed that her termination was unconstitutional gender 
discrimination. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, began his 
analysis by stating that the equal protection component of the due pro-
cess clause conferred on a plaintiff a federal constitutional right to be 
free from gender discrimination that is not substantially related to the 
achievement of important governmental objectives. 25 Brennan consid-
ered separately whether plaintiff had a cause of action to assert that 
right, and, if so, whether damages would be an appropriate form of 
relief. 
The majority opinion concluded that a litigant has a cause of ac-
tion if she is "a member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter 
of law, appropriately invoke the power of the court."26 Brennan 
stressed that the inquiry into whether a particular plaintiff has an im-
plied cause of action under a constitutional provision is "fundamen-
tally different" from the inquiry into whether a plaintiff has an implied 
cause of action under a statute.27 The decision whether to imply a 
cause of action from a statute is ultimately a matter of interpreting 
congressional intent. The decision whether to recognize a private 
icy functions that the Constitution vests exclusively in Congress. 403 U.S. at 418, 427-30. This 
fundamental constitutional issue still may not have been laid to rest to the satisfaction of all the 
present members of the Court. In the recent decision in Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983), 
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court but at this point reflecting a view not his own, observed 
that if the Court were writing on a clean slate, it might hold that the remedial powers of federal 
courts do not extend beyond the granting of relief expressly authorized by Congress. 103 S. Ct. 
at 2408-09. He regarded it as appropriate to spend several pages reviewing cases establishing the 
courts' independent power to remedy violations of the Constitution. 103 S. Ct. at 2409-12. In 
1980, dissenting from the decision in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 32-44 (1980), Justice Rehn-
quist said the Court had taken a "wrong tum" in Bivens, and argued at length that the inference 
of civil damage remedies from any provision of the Constitution is beyond the power of the 
federal courts. But the tum taken in Bivens, whether right or wrong, is now "firmly established" 
in Supreme Court precedent. 103 S. Ct. at 2409. This Article does not re-examine that tum, but 
instead assumes the constitutional power of federal courts to recognize damage remedies for the 
violation of constitutional rights by federal agents, absent congressional authorization of such 
remedies. 
23. Earlier, in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), a plaintiff had sued for damages, 
alleging claims under several provisions of the Constitution, including the due process clause of 
the fifth amendment and the first amendment. 438 U.S. at 482-83, 483 n.5. The Court decided 
issues of immunity raised by the case, and disavowed deciding or discussing what personal inter-
ests, other than those protected by the fourth amendment, could be vindicated by a suit for 
damages. 438 U.S. at 485, 486 n.8. However, the case did reaffirm the holding in Bivens. 438 
U.S. at 504. 
24. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
25. 442 U.S. at 234-35. 
26. 442 U.S. at 240 n.18. 
27. 442 U.S. at 241. 
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cause of action under the Constitution is not. Declaring that the judi-
ciary is the primary means through which constitutional rights may be 
enforced,28 Justice Brennan wrote, "the class of those litigants who 
allege that their own constitutional rights have been violated, and who 
. . . have no effective means other than the judiciary to enforce these 
rights, must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for 
the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights."29 Because Ms. 
Davis claimed that her equal protection rights had been violated and 
that she had no effective means of redress other than the courts, Bren-
nan concluded that she did have a cause of action to seek relief under 
the fifth amendment. 
Next, the Court addressed the propriety of a damages remedy, 
finding this an easy case. It found that such relief would be judicially 
manageable, the courts having much experience handling statutory 
claims for back pay deriving from sex discrimination cases, and the 
questions of causation and valuation not being difficult. 30 It found 
that no alternative forms of judicial relief, such as reinstatement, were 
available, as the defendant was no longer a congressman. In a foot-
note, the Court rejected as inadequate the alternative of a claim under 
state law.31 The Court stated that a suit against a congressman for 
unconstitutional actions taken in the course of his official conduct does 
raise special concerns counselling hesitation. However, the Court held 
that such grounds for hesitation were coextensive with whatever pro-
tection the congressman was afforded by the speech or debate clause of 
the Constitution, 32 a question it left for the lower courts' considera-
tion. 33 Further applying the tests suggested by Bivens, the Court 
found there to be no explicit congressional declaration that persons in 
plaintiff's position could not recover damages.34 It rejected a reading 
of Section 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196435 - pro-
28. 442 U.S. at 241. 
29. 442 U.S. at 242. 
30. 442 U.S. at 245. 
31. 442 U.S. at 245-46 n.23. 
32. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 6, cl. I. 
33. Davis, 442 U.S. at 236 n.11, 246. 
34. 442 U.S. at 246-47. 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982). The section reads, in pertinent part: 
(a) All personnel actions affecting employees • . . in executive agencies . • • in those units 
of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government having positions in the 
competitive service • . • shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin. 
(c) [Within prescribed time limits] an employee ..• if aggrieved by the final disposition of 
his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a civil action 
. . . in which . . • the head of the department, agency or unit, as appropriate, shall be the 
defendant. 
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tecting certain classes of federal employees from discrimination - as 
such an explicit declaration, holding that section 717 left undisturbed 
the remedies of persons, like Ms. Davis, not covered by the statute. 36 
Finally, the Court again rejected a feared deluge of claims as a ground 
for denying the plaintiff a money damage remedy.37 Implicitly, the 
Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's view that such a remedy should be 
denied unless it is constitutionally compelled. 38 
Carlson v. Green39 was the third Supreme Court case directly in the 
Bivens line. Plaintiff sued federal prison officials on behalf of the estate 
of her son, alleging that he had died because of defendants' deliber-
ately indifferent acts and omissions in treating his chronic asthma. 
She alleged violations of his due process, equal protection and eighth 
amendment rights.40 The Supreme Court held that plaintiff had stated 
a Bivens claim. Neither of the situations postulated in Bivens as de-
feating the right of a victim of constitutional violations to recover 
damages against a federal official was present here. First, no special 
factors counselled hesitation. Pointedly contrasting Davis v. Passman, 
the Court observed that defendants did not enjoy a special status in 
our constitutional scheme which suggested that judicially created rem-
edies against them might be inappropriate. Although requiring them 
to defend might inhibit their effort to perform their official duties, the 
qualified immunity accorded by Butz v. Economou41 provided all the 
protection those defendants ought to have.42 
Second, the Court found that Congress had not provided an alter-
native remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recov-
ery directly under the Constitution and which it viewed as equally 
effective.43 The Court rejected the argument that the 1974 amend-
36. 442 U.S. at 247. Justice Powell disagreed with this construction of Title VII, in a dissent-
ing opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist. 442 U.S. 251, 254. Citing Brown 
v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976), where the Court held that§ 717 "provides the 
exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment," Powell argued 
that in exempting its own employees from protection under§ 717, Congress made clear its inten-
tion that its employees should be denied all judicial relief for claims of employment discrimina-
tion. See note 311 infra. 
37. 442 U.S. at 248. 
38. Of the dissents in Davis, that written by Justice Powell most directly questioned the logic 
and precedential basis for some of the broad language in Justice Brennan's majority opinion. 442 
U.S. 251, 252. Justice Powell, Chief Justice Btirger and Justice Rehnquist also argued that the 
majority gave too little weight to the needs of congressmen to control their own staffs and to 
separation of powers concerns. 442 U.S. at 249-51. 
39. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
40. 446 U.S. at 16 & n.1. The equal protection claim was predicated on plaintiff's allegation 
that defendants' indifference was in part attributable to racial prejudice. 
41. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). See note 23 supra. 
42. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19. 
43. 446 U.S. at 18-19. 
276 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:269 
ments to the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA),44 creating a cause of 
action against the United States for certain intentional torts commit-
ted by federal law enforcement officers, was thus preemptive of Bivens 
claims, rather than merely complementary.45 In support of this con-
clusion, the Court marshalled legislative history, the congressional 
practice of explicitly stating when it meant to make an FTCA remedy 
exclusive, and four factors regarded by the Court as suggesting the 
greater efficacy of a Bivens remedy and thus indicative of Congress' 
intent that Bivens actions against federal officials would survive the 
1974 FTCA amendments.46 The Court found a Bivens action to be 
more effective than the FTCA remedy first because, being recoverable 
against individuals, a Bivens remedy is a more effective deterrent 
against unconstitutional behavior, and secqnd because decisions of the 
Court indicated that punitive damages might be awarded in a Bivens 
suit, but are statutorily prohibited in FTCA actions. This too en-
hanced the deterrent impact of Bivens suits as against FTCA actions.47 
The Court also attached significance to the right to a jury trial in a 
Bivens action, a right that does not exist in an FTCA suit.48 Finally, in 
concluding that the FTCA is not a sufficient protector of constitu-
tional rights, 49 the Court commented that an FTCA action exists only 
if the state in which the alleged misconduct occurred would recognize 
a claim for that misconduct, whereas the liability of federal officials for 
violation of constitutional rights should be governed by uniform 
rules.50 
Two Justices concurred in the judgment but took issue with the 
majority's restatement of the principles governing Bivens actions. Two 
other Justices dissented. Those troubled by the Court's language be-
lieved that the Court had gone beyond both Bivens and Davis in indi-
cating that the existence of adequate alternative avenues of redress 
would not defeat a Bivens action unless Congress had "clothed [such 
44. 28 u.s.c. § 2680(h) (1982). 
45. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19. ' 
46. 446 U.S. at 19-23. 
47. 446 U.S. at 21-22. 
48. 446 U.S. at 22-23. 
49. 446 U.S. at 23. 
50. 446 U.S. at 22-23. Relying on this same preference for uniformity as better serving the 
goals of Bivens actions, the Court went on to hold that, pursuant to a federal common law rule of 
survivorship, the Bivens claims survived the death of plaintiffs son. 446 U.S. at 23-25. The 
Court left the door open, however, to federal law incorporation of state rules, as a matter of 
convenience, on other survivorship questions that might arise in Bivens actions. 446 U.S. at 25 
n.11. 
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alternative avenues] in the prescribed linguistic garb"51 by explicitly 
declaring them to be substitutes for Bivens actions. Although the 
Court denied that it was requiring Congress to recite any "magic 
words"52 before an alternative remedial scheme would be deemed 
preclusive of Bivens claims, the concurring and dissenting Justices 
were troubled by what they perceived as a drastic curtailment of a 
court's discretion when presented with the question whether to imply 
a remedy directly from the Constitution. 53 
The concurring Justices also correctly pointed out that the concept 
of special factors counselling hesitation provided only a cryptic guide 
to decision. 54 The Court had found no special factors to be present in 
either Bivens or Carlson and the notion had not been much clarified by 
the Court's suggestion in Davis that "independent status in our consti-
tutional scheme"55 might be such a factor because it then had con-
cluded that the immunity created by the speech or debate clause 
afforded all the protection necessary.56 Despite the criticisms of the 
majority opinion, the Justices concurring in Carlson agreed that it was 
correct to imply a damage remedy on the facts of that case, both be-
cause they viewed the FfCA as an inadequate remedy and because 
Congress appeared not to have intended the FfCA to displace Bivens 
claims.57 
51. 446 U.S. at 27 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Stewart, J.). See also 446 U.S. at 30-31 
& n.2 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). 
52. 446 U.S. at 19 n.5. 
53. 446 U.S. at 27-28 (Powell, J., concurring), 30-31 (Burger, C. J., dissenting), 52-53 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). 
54. 446 U.S. at 27 (Powell, J., concurring). 
55. 446 U.S. at 19. 
56. Davis, 442 U.S. at 246. Presumably, the special factors counselling hesitation are not 
identical to those factors that lead to immunities, or that prong of the Bivens test would swallow 
immunity doctrine and render it superfluous. At most, one can infer from the Court's approach 
in Davis that the factors favoring a constitutional or common law immunity are also relevant to 
whether a cause of action should be implied. But the Davis court preferred to allow those factors 
to operate by way of defense, rather than have them affect the decision whether to imply the 
cause of action. 
57. 446 U.S. at 28 & n.1. Justices Powell and Stewart noted several factors which they 
viewed as establishing the inadequacy of the FfCA. They said that the FfCA is not truly a 
federal remedial scheme at all; it is a waiver of sovereign immunity that permits claimants to 
recover against the United States when a private person would be liable under the law of the state 
where the wrong occurred. Thus, as in Bivens, a plaintiff denied a constitutional remedy would 
be left to the vagaries of state law. Second, they commented that the statute is "hedged with 
protections for the United States." Third, as the Court pointed out, the FfCA allows neither 
jury trial nor punitive damages. Finally, it disallows recovery when a claim arises from a "discre-
tionary function" or "the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such ... be valid." 
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
Justice Rehnquist's dissent attacked the concept of Bivens actions altogether. 446 U.S. at 31, 
32-44, 51, 53-54. So far as this particular case was concerned, he criticized the failure of the 
Court to provide guidance for deciding when a constitutional provision permits an inference that 
an individual may recover damages. 446 U.S. at 35. He took issue with the Court's reading of 
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In 1983, the Court summarized the law to date as follows: 
This much is established by our prior cases. The federal courts' statutory 
jurisdiction to decide federal questions confers adequate power to award 
damages to the victim of a constitutional violation. When Congress pro-
vides an alternative remedy, it may, of course, indicate its intent, by stat-
utory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps even by the 
statutory remedy itself, that the Court's power should not be exercised. 
In the absence of such a congressional directive, the federal courts must 
make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a com-
mon-law tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special fac-
tors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal 
litigation. 58 
B. The Constitutional Theory Reflected 
When the Supreme Court decided Bivens those Justices who dis-
sented argued that the Court was arrogating to itself a power that it 
did not constitutionally possess. Judicial recognition of a cause of ac-
tion for money damages was said to impinge on legislative and policy 
functions that the Constitution vests exclusively in Congress. 59 
Although some members of the Court maintained that view until at 
least 1980, 60 it seems now to be settled that the federal courts do have 
power to award money damages against federal officials in order to 
vindicate constitutional rights whether or not Congress has expressly 
authorized such suits. 6I The courts' power to do so springs from the 
grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts to decide all cases "aris[ing] 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."62 The 
Supreme Court exercised this power in Bivens, Davis and Carlson, and 
it reaffirmed the power in Chappell v. Wallace63 and Bush v. Lucas, 64 
the two Bivens cases it decided, with no dissenters, in 1983. 
the legislative history of the FTCA, 446 U.S. at 33 n.2, and he challenged each of the four factors 
that the Court marshalled to show the greater effectiveness of Bivens than of FTCA actions. In 
brief, Justice Rehnquist questioned the deterrent effect of Bivens actions and the availability of 
punitive damages in Bivens actions. He saw no basis for viewing Congress' failure to specify that 
the FTCA was to substitute for Bivens actions as indicating that in Congress' mind the right of a 
plaintiff to have a jury trial in a Bivens case was a reason for Bivens actions to survive alongside 
FTCA actions. Justice Rehnquist also found no significant interest in uniform rules governing 
the liability of federal officials accused of unconstitutional conduct. 446 U.S. at 44-50. 
58. Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2411 (1983). 
59. Bivens. 403 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J. dissenting), 427-30 (Black, J., dissenting). 
60. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 34-44 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also note 
22supra. 
61. Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2411, quoted in text at note 58 supra. 
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). See Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2409; Butz v. Economou, 
438 U.S. 478, 486, 504 (1978). 
63. 103 s. Ct. 2362, 2364 (1983). 
64. 103 s. Ct. 2404, 2409-11 (1983). 
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On the three occasions that the Court exercised its power to create 
a cause of action for money damages directly under the Constitution, 
it may or may not have believed that that particular remedy was "in-
dispensable" in the sense that no other remedial scheme could possibly 
prevent the substantive constitutional guarantee in question from be-
coming meaningless to the plaintiff, a "mere form of words."65 Some 
commentators have read the holding and outcome in Bivens itself as 
being constitutionally required in this sense of giving the plaintiff what 
the Constitution minimally required. 66 Other commentators disagree, 
viewing Bivens as constitutional common law;67 law which goes be-
yond the minimum requirements of the Constitution to carry out the 
purposes and policies of the fourth amendment. 6 8 
Whichever of these two approaches the Court viewed itself as tak-
ing in the three Bivens cases decided in favor of plaintiffs, what is im-
portant for present purposes is the realization that there can be 
occasions when a money damage remedy against an offending official 
6S. This phrase is from Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6SS (1961). The notion of indispensabil-
ity used in the text is from Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 8S 
HARV. L. REV. 1S32, 1S48-49 (1972). 
66. See, e.g., Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. 
REv. 1117, 113S-38 (1978). Schrock and Welsh argue that.the Court decided that, for persons 
circumstanced as was Mr. Bivens, a cause of action for money damages derives from the fourth 
amendment itself. They find support in language of both Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, 
and Justice Harlan, concurring, indicating that the Court had to use the money damage remedy 
or be derelict in fulfilling its fourth amendment duties. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 39S-97, 407-08 & 
n.8. Among the most important passages they cite is that in which Justice Harlan said, 
"[T]oday's decision has little, if indeed any, bearing on the question whether a federal court may 
properly devise remedies - other than traditionally available forms of judicial relief - for the 
purpose of enforcing substantive social policies embodied in constitutional or statutory policies," 
and in which he characterized as a separate question whether a court had power to create pro-
phylactic measures. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 408 n.8. Schrock and Welsh understand Justice Harlan 
to be speaking of judge-made prophylactic measures which are not required by the Constitution. 
67. See, e.g., Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. l, 23-24 
(197S) (Monaghan relies on the Court's rejection of the question posed in Bivens as whether the 
availability of money damages is "necessary" to enforce the fourth amendment, Bivens, 403 U.S. 
at 397, and on the analogy to the common law process of articulating the remedial implications 
of federal statutory rights); Note, The Limit of Implied Constitutional Damages Actions: New 
Boundaries far Bivens, SS N.Y.U. L. REv. 1238, 1244 n.SO, 124S n.Sl (1980). 
68. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234 (1979), the Court characterized Bivens as holding 
that a damages remedy was "an appropriate form of redress." The Court similarly held in Davis 
that damages were "an appropriate form of remedy." 442 U.S. at 234, 24S. It went on to say 
that "were Congress to create equally effective alternative remedies, the need for damage$ relief 
might be obviated." 442 U.S. at 248. This language suggests that the Court viewed the damage 
remedy it was affording plaintiff as not indispensable, but as subject to modification by Congress, 
within limits - thus what Monaghan, supra note 67, calls constitutional common law. The 
decision in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980), bolsters this conclusion in taking the 
position, and reading Bivens as establishing, that a cause of action for money damages will not be 
recognized when Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it declares to be a substi-
tute for recovery directly under the Constitution and which it views as equally effective. See also 
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 4S7 U.S. 731, 789-90 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) ("Congress retains the 
power to restrict exposure to liability .... " However, Justice White also indicates that legisla-
tively prescribed remedies must be "adequate."). 
280 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:269 
is constitutionally required, is indispensable because no other remedial 
scheme does or could prevent the substantive constitutional guarantee 
in question from becoming an empty form of words to the plaintiff. 69 
69. In some instances, if not all, a money damage remedy against a unit of government rather 
than against an official sued in his individual capacity would also suffice. 
There was before the 98th Congress, and there is before the 99th Congress, a proposal to 
substitute the United States for the individual official as the defendant in constitutional tort cases. 
See S. 775 and S. 829, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 492, 99th Cong., !st Sess. (1985). The bill 
leaves open the question of the extent to which federal law recognizes claims for money damages 
arising under the Constitution, for it provides, in pertinent part: "The United States shall be 
liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims arising under the Constitution 
of the United States, to the extent recognized or provided by applicable Federal law • ••• " S. 775, 
§ 3 (emphasis added). The quoted language would appear in 28 U.S.C. § 2674 in a new subsec-
tion (b)(l). The bill would also provide subject matter jurisdiction in the U.S. district courts 
over 
civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, sounding in tort aris-
ing under the Constitution of the United States for injury or loss of property, or personal 
injury or death, caused by an act or omission of any employee of the Government while 
acting within the scope of his office or employment, such liability to be determined in accord-
ance with applicable Federal law. 
S.775 § 1 (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2) (emphasis added)). By so providing, the bill, in ef· 
fect, incorporates the court-made law scrutinized in this Article, dictating the circumstances 
under which first amendment violations are compensable through money damages. 
This proposed legislation reflects recent scholarly commentary that has raised serious ques-
tions about actions for money damages which lie against federal officials for their alleged consti-
tutional torts. Professor Peter Schuck, for example, has described serious shortcomings of our 
present remedial schemes in fulfilling the goals of public tort law, identified as compensating 
victims, deterring wrongdoing without unduly undermining vigorous decisonmaking, exemplify. 
ing society's moral principles, and placing remedial decisions in the hands of the institutions 
which can most competently and most legitimately make those decisions. P. SCHUCK, SUING 
GOVERNMENT 16-25 (1983). His analysis leads him to advocate substitution of remedies against 
the government for remedies against individual officials as one component of a better response. 
Id. at 109-11. See also Madden, Allard & Remes, Bedtime/or Bivens: Substituting the United 
States as Defendant in Constitutional Tort Suits, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGJS. 469 (1983). 
There seems to be little doubt that the present system is seriously flawed. It is not the mission 
of this Article to advocate maintenance of actions against officials in their individual capacities, 
as preferable to a money damage remedy against some agency of the government itself; there are 
pros and cons to both approaches and inescapable uncertainty as to the real effects the one has 
and the other would have. Professor Schuck's advocacy of remedies against the government 
which would replace monetary liability of individual government officials is predicated in part 
upon his concern that the present system seriously jeopardizes vigorous decisionmaking. Yet, as 
he acknowledges, "systematic" evidence does not exist as to how public officials actually perceive 
and evaluate the risk of being sued and the costs associated with that risk, P. SCHUCK, supra, at 
69-71. Shifting liability to the government, or some unit thereof, might well increase the chances 
of actual recovery by a plaintiff who won a judgment, as the United States is much less likely to 
be judgment-proof than is an individual. But it is by no means certain that the goal of deterring 
violations of constitutional rights would be better served by such a shift. The notion that deter-
rence would be promoted by the shift to government liability is counterintuitive. See, e.g., Carl-
son v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980). Moreover, many factors other than a government unit's 
vulnerability to money judgments for the unconstitutional activities of its agents affect how well 
the unit will train its personnel to respect the constitutional rights of its own members and of the 
public it serves. See, e.g., P. SCHUCK, supra, at 105-08. And there are influences on individual 
agents other than the values inculcated by the agencies that employ them. Nor is it certain that 
vigorous decisionmaking, of a desirable sort, would be enhanced by a shift of liability to the 
government. A government agency's self-protective tendencies could cause it to inculcate a cau-
tiousness that would be worse than the individually evolved self-protective tendencies which con· 
cern Schuck. New or different sanctions available against individual officials could keep them 
timid. Even if decisionmaking were to be invigorated by a shift to government liability, that 
might well occur only at the cost of increased and increasingly serious violations of constitutional 
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This is important because when a money damage remedy is constitu-
tionally required, Congress is without power to revise or replace that 
remedy.70 A remedy that is merely constitutional common law can be 
altered by Congress, 71 given congressional power to legislate in the 
area, 72 but a remedy that is constitutionally indispensable cannot 
properly be tampered with by Congress.73 It would seem to follow 
that when Congress has afforded some avenue of redress for a consti-
tutional violation and the courts are asked to recognize a cause of ac-
tion under the Constitution, it is incumbent upon the courts to 
determine whether the requested Bivens remedy is constitutionally re-
quired or whether, to the contrary, it is not so required because the 
congressional remedy that has been afforded is constitutionally 
adequate. 
What, then, must a court decide in determining whether a legisla-
tive remedial scheme should preclude a Bivens action in a particular 
case? First, the court should decide whether the statutory scheme was 
intended by Congress to be exclusive and to substitute for a Bivens 
action which previously was recognized or which otherwise might be 
recognized in the future. 74 If the court concludes that the legislated 
remedies were not intended to be exclusive, then a Bivens remedy 
properly can be afforded, 75 other things being equal, 76 even if the legis-
rights. Still another factor is that the shift to government liability would frustrate whatever 
desire victims have for personalized retribution. 
70. Dellinger, supra note 65, at 1548-49. 
71. Dellinger, supra note 65, at 1547-48; Monaghan, supra note 67, at 28-29. 
72. Dellinger locates the sources of congressional power to legislate remedies for cases arising 
under the Bill of Rights in three places, some or all of which may be applicable in a given case: 
first, in a relevant enumerated congressional power; second, by inference from the judiciary 
clauses of articles I and III, conferring on Congress the power to constitute and create courts 
inferior to the Supreme Court; and third, as necessary and proper, U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, 
for the execution of the judicial power over cases arising under the Constitution, and for imple-
mentation of congressional powers under articles I and III. Dellinger, supra note 65, at 1546-47. 
73. Dellinger is worth quoting. He says, 
Congress['] . . . authority to displace or modify a remedy independently created by the 
Court to implement constitutional provisions would depend upon the relationship of the 
remedy created to its substantive constitutional predicate. . . . [E]ven where the Court con-
cludes that a particular remedy is "part and parcel" of the underlying constitutional right, 
Congress is not necessarily barred from substituting an alternative remedial scheme, pro-
vided it affords comparable vindication of the constitutional provision involved. On the 
other hand, if there were ever a case in which it could be established that a particular rem-
edy was "indispensable" in the sense that no other remedial scheme could possibly prevent 
the substantive constitutional requirements from becoming a "mere form of words," then, 
and only then, would Congress be wholly without power to revise or replace that remedy. 
Dellinger, supra note 65, at 1547-49 (footnotes omitted). 
74. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19. 
75. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19-20. 
76. "Other things being equal," in this context, means that special factors counselling hesita-
tion do not exist and that the court, as a common law tribunal, is capable of making the types of 
judgments necessary to accord meaningful compensation. Depending upon how complete and 
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lated remedies meet constitutional minima. If, however, the court 
concludes that the legislated remedies were intended by Congress to be 
exclusive and to substitute for and preclude a Bivens remedy, then the 
court should determine whether the congressional scheme would af-
ford the plaintiff constitutionally adequate relief. 77 
In determining whether the congressionally afforded relief is con-
stitutionally adequate, the court should be careful to judge adequacy 
for the plaintiff. "[T]he fact that persons in other situations may have 
access to remedies that will vindicate their rights under the constitu-
tional provision in question should not preclude the judicial creation 
of remedies for a particular plaintiff who is without effective means of 
redress."78 Focusing on the situation of the individual plaintiff also 
has the salutary effect of requiring the court to assure itself that one in 
plaintiff's position was intended to be covered by the exclusive statute 
in question. If he was not, one need no longer be concerned with the 
legislated remedy. 
If plaintiff was intended to be covered by the statute in question, 
but is denied all relief under the statute, then the court should inde-
pendently determine whether such treatment is constitutional. An in-
dividual might be able to plead all the elements of a Bivens action but 
not be able to meet substantive elements of, or to defeat merely statu-
tory defenses to, the statutory cause of action. For him the statutory 
remedy is no remedy at all. The court should not assume that the 
statutory remedy is constitutionally adequate just because it was in-
tended by Congress to afford the exclusive remedy for violations of the 
constitutional rights of some class of persons. To merely assume the 
constitutional adequacy of an "exclusive" statutory remedy is to per-
mit Congress to deny an individual all remedy because he fails to state 
a statutory claim or cannot meet mere statutory defenses. That would 
amount to allowing Congress to define what constitutes a violation of 
particular guarantees in the Bill of Rights, when the function of defin-
satisfactory the legislative remedy is, a court could properly decide not to imply a Bivens remedy, 
however. 
77. The courts should not defer to a congressional determination of constitutional adequacy. 
Instead, the courts should make their own determination of whether the remedy considered by 
Congress to be equally effective is in fact constitutionally adequate as applied to the particular 
plaintiff before the court. See text at notes 80..85 infra. The concurring Justices in Carlson, 446 
U.S. at 28, took just this approach, arguing that an "implied remedy is plainly appropriate" 
because the FrCA "simply is not an adequate remedy." (Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, 
concluded that Congress did not intend the FrCA to substitute for a Bivens remedy, 446 U.S. at 
19-20, and thus was not faced with the question of whether the remedies provided were constitu-
tionally adequate. Justice Brennan did demonstrate, however, that the FrCA "is not a sufficient 
protector of the citizens' constitutional rights," 446 U.S. at 23, to shore up his conclusion that 
Congress intended the FrCA to complement the Bivens remedy, not replace it.) 
78. Dellinger, supra note 65, at 1551. 
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ing constitutional violations is properly the Court's under Marbury v. 
Madison. 19 Since a court should not defer to Congress' definition of a 
violation of constitutional rights, it should independently determine 
whether one left without a statutory remedy has stated a claim under 
the Constitution. If he has, the court should afford a suitable Bivens 
remedy. 
If plaintiff is afforded a remedy under the legislative scheme, then 
the court should independently determine whether the remedy ade-
quately vindicates plaintiff's constitutional rights. One aspect of the 
analysis should focus on whether the legislative remedy speaks to the 
violation suffered. If an individual's constitutional rights have been 
violated, the relief afforded should contain retrospective relief. Simi-
larly, if an individual's constitutional rights have not yet been violated, 
but the risk to him is sufficiently great that he meets the requirements 
of standing, a case or controversy, and the like, 80 the relief afforded 
should take the form of prospective relief. A legislated remedy not 
"facing in the right direction" would be constitutionally inadequate. 81 
The hardest case is posed by the person whose constitutional rights 
have been violated and who has grounds for fearing future violations. 
Would a purely prospective remedy be constitutionally adequate for 
him? It seems not. Although one could say that such a remedy would 
not render the constitutional right in question a "mere form of words" 
for the plaintiff, it would afford no remedy at all for the constitutional 
violations already suffered. As to those violations of his rights, pro-
spective relief is no relief at all. Hence, to be constitutionally adequate, 
a remedy for this plaintiff would have to include both retrospective 
and prospective components. 
The court also should consider whether the plaintiff was permitted 
meaningful access to the legislative remedies. In speaking of "mean-
ingful access" I do not refer to the question of whether the plaintiff has 
stated a claim for relief under the statute, nor to the adequacy of the 
legislated remedy per se. I refer to the procedural prerequisites to re-
79. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is."). 
80. The Court has said that "[T]o entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to 
determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is 
immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action .... " Ex parte 
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam), quoted with approval in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 
1, 13 (1972). The Court there added, "Allegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate 
substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm . • • ." 
408 U.S. at 13-14. 
81. In a case where it was unclear whether Congress intended its remedial scheme to be 
exclusive, a finding that the remedy afforded plaintiff fails to "face in the right direction" would 
be evidence that Congress did not intend its remedy to preclude implication of a Bivens action. 
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covery under the statute. Unreasonable procedural hurdles or break-
downs in the statutory procedural system due to human frailties can 
prevent an aggrieved person from attaining a statutory remedy. These 
obstacles could be attacked as violations of the aggrieved party's right 
to procedural due process. Alternatively, such procedural obstacles 
might be regarded as bearing upon the adequacy of the statutory rem-
edy on the theory that, absent meaningful access, the legislated reme-
dies cannot be adequate, no matter how satisfactory they would be if 
available. 82 
To say that a remedy must "face in the right direction" and be 
meaningfully accessible to plaintiff does not say much, of course. As-
suming it does so, what more is required? Another facet of the analy-
sis is that the court must appraise whether the legislated remedy 
actually available to the plaintiff is meaningful. In doing this, the no-
tion that the constitutional guarantee must not be a "mere form of 
words" takes center stage. Under the test suggested in Bivens and pro-
nounced in Carlson, 83 a legislative remedial scheID;e will preclude im-
plication of a Bivens remedy if Congress viewed its remedy as equally 
effective as a Bivens remedy and explicitly declared its remedy to be a 
substitute therefor. Since a Bivens remedy adequately vindicates plain-
tiff's constitutional rights, a legislative scheme which is equally effec-
tive would meet constitutional minima as well. The question, if the 
court in fact views the legislative remedial scheme as less effective, 84 is 
how much less will suffice. At a minimum, the remedy afforded 
should be truly compensatory; mere symbolic relief is inadequate. 
If Congress has chosen to make its remedy exclusive, and it has 
afforded an adequate remedy, the court ordinarily should abide by 
Congress' decision. Such a legislative decision meets the minimum 
that the Constitution requires. Arguably, deference is appropriate 
when Congress has performed the legislative function of choosing 
among rational alternative remedial schemes85 which "face in the right 
direction," are truly compensatory, and present no undue procedural 
hurdles. 
This discussion of the constitutional theory which does, or should, 
82. Like a finding that plaintiffs statutory remedy fails to "face in the right direction," the 
absence of meaningful access may be cited among the reasons for concluding that a statutory 
remedy was not intended to be exclusive. At this point in the text, however, it is assumed that 
the legislated remedy was intended to be exclusive. 
83. 446 U.S. at 18-19. 
84. See note 77 supra. 
85. The choice among federal remedial schemes is typically a legislative function. See, e.g, 
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397, 407; Carlson, 446 U.S. at 27-28 (Powell, J., concurring), 34-44 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). 
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support Bivens actions will be drawn upon in the succeeding pages, 
where Chappell v. Wallace and Bush v. Lucas are critiqued. In addi-
tion, it is hoped that what was said here will provide some useful guid-
ance to the courts. 
C. Chappell and Bush 
On June 13, 1983, the Court decided both Chappell v. Wallace86 
and Bush v. Lucas. 87 The question framed by the Court in Chappell 
was whether enlisted military personnel may sue to recover damages 
from superior officers for injuries sustained as a result of violations of 
constitutional rights suffered in the course of military service. 88 Plain-
tiffs had alleged several forms of racial discrimination: failures to as-
sign them desirable duties, threats, low performance evaluations, and 
unusually severe punishments. Finding that special factors counselled 
hesitation, the Court members unanimously decided not to allow a 
Bivens remedy. The Court focused on two factors. It relied in part 
upon the peculiar relationship of a soldier to his superiors, including 
"the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and 
equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel, [which] would be 
undermined by a judicially created remedy exposing officers to per-
sonal liability at the hands of those they are charged to command."89 
86. 103 s. Ct. 2362 (1983). 
87. 103 s. Ct. 2404 (1983). 
88. 103 S. Ct. at 2363-64. 
89. 103 S. Ct. at 2367. In this aspect of its reasoning the Court relied heavily upon Feres v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), for "guidance." In Feres the Supreme Court held that the 
government is not liable under the FICA for injuries to servicemen when the injuries arise out 
of, or occur in the course of, activity inqident to service. 340 U.S. at 146. In so holding, the 
Court was purportedly implementing congressional intent. The Court has said that the Feres 
doctrine rests upon the special relationship of the soldier to his superiors and the effects of main-
tenance of such suits on discipline, see United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954); United 
States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963), the existence of a no-fault compensation scheme pursuant 
to the Veterans Benefits Act, see Feres, 340 U.S. at 144-45; Stencel Aero Engg. Corp. v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 666, 671 (1977), and the impropriety of subjecting military personnel to varia-
tions in state law when seeking relief. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 143. 
Chappell took a position similar to, but not quite as straightforward as, that of the lower 
courts which had held that the Feres doctrine itself immunizes from Bivens actions military and 
civilian government employees sued in their individual capacities for injuries incident to military 
service. See, e.g., Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975); Bailey v. De Quevado, 
375 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1967); Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185, 190-92 (D. Md. 1980); Nagy v. 
United States, 471 F. Supp. 383, 384 (D.D.C. 1979) (an alternative ground of the decision was 10 
U.S.C. § 1089, which makes a suit under the FICA the sole remedy for personal injury caused 
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of military medical personnel, expressly exclusive of 
any civil action against such medical personnel). 
In a scathing dissent in Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981), see text at notes 
174-89 infra, Judges Gibbons and Sloviter forcefully attacked the argument that military neces-
sity demands that a Bivens remedy be denied to servicemen. They contrasted the line of cases 
beginning with Peres, which construed the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity in the 
FICA, with the line of cases determining the immunity from liability enjoyed by government 
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It concluded, "Civilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long 
before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the es-
tablished relationship between enlisted military personnel and their su-
perior officers; that relationship is at the heart of the necessarily 
unique structure of the military establishment. "90 
If the Court's decision had rested on this ground alone, one could 
agree or disagree with it,91 but it would not represent a deviation from 
the type of analysis prescribed by prior cases. It appears, however, that 
the Court did not believe that the unique disciplinary structure of the 
military alone would suffice to defeat plaintiffs' action. The Court re-
lied on a second factor counselling hesitation: the Constitution's grant 
to Congress of plenary and exclusive authority over the military, in-
officials engaged in intentional misconduct. The judges made the point that the latter, not the 
former, line of cases is the relevant one, 663 F.2d at 1252, and demonstrated that past cases 
afforded military officers the same degree of immunity as enjoyed by civilian defendants. As the 
immunity for civilians changed from nearly absolute to qualified, compare Barr v. Matteo, 360 
U.S. 564 (1959), with Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), and Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 
478 (1978), it similarly changed for military defendants, compare Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 
(1959), with Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). Jaffee, 663 F.2d at 1252-55. Judges Gib-
bons and Sloviter further showed that civilian courts have held military officers accountable for 
their conduct in actions for money damages. E.g., Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877); Little v. 
Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). Thus, to the extent a court relies on "the necessity for 
aggressive exercise of military decisionmaking as a reason for its holding, it has strayed far 
outside the limits of traditional American thinking about the appropriate role of the military in 
our government." 663 F.2d at 1256. 
The two judges went on to explode the conclusion that a Bivens cause of action must be 
denied to encourage unquestioned obedience by military inferiors. They showed that military 
officers have been held liable in the civil courts for intentional torts, e.g., Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 
U.S. (12 How.) 389 (1851), without military discipline apparently suffering any significant harm. 
They also noted that "[t]he policy of American military law is not to encourage blind obedience 
by discouraging complaints of official misconduct." 663 F.2d at 1259. The Uniform Code of 
Military Justice and its predecessors encourage such complaints, 10 U.S.C. §§ 938, 939, and the 
results of such complaints are judicially reviewable. 663 F.2d at 1260 (citing cases). The dissent-
ers concluded that "it requires a considerable judicial impudence to announce that permitting 
complaints in a court oflaw would be injurious to the discipline of the armed services." 663 F.2d 
at 1260. The dissenters went on to note that Congress has never conferred absolute immunity on 
military officers, as an additional ground in opposition to the effect of the majority's decision in 
Jaffee, and equally pertinent to the Supreme Court's later decision in Chappell In their view, the 
decision not to allow a Bivens action was a major assault upon military accountability to civil 
government. "Rather than a 'special factor counselling hesitation,' the military status of the vic-
tims and the perpetr;itors is a special factor calling for vigilance." 663 F.2d at 1262. 
Judge Adams, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Jaffee, also was critical of the 
majority's use of the considerations underlying Feres immunity in deciding whether "special fac-
tors" foreclosed plaintiffs' suit. In remarks equally applicable to the Supreme Court's tack in 
Chappell, he argued that under the analysis in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), the court 
should have held that plaintiff could assert a cause of action under the Constitution, and then 
considered whether the immunity of the government established in Feres should be extended to 
shield individual military and civilian defendants from suits alleging intentional misconduct. 663 
F.2d at 1241-42. In Davis the Court allowed the Bivens claim, subject to any immunity which 
might be furnished by the speech or debate clause, rather than rely on that potential immunity as 
a special factor leading to rejection of the Bivens cause of action. 
90. 103 S. Ct. at 2365. 
91. See note 89 supra. 
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eluding military discipline and justice.92 Because Congress had estab-
lished a comprehensive internal system of justice to regulate military 
matters, which provides for the review and remedy of complaints of 
the kind plaintiffs asserted, the Court concluded that it would be 
"plainly inconsistent with Congress' authority in this field" for the ci-
vilian courts to recognize a Bivens cause of action.93 
The Court's treatment of this second factor is troubling in several 
respects. First, the Court did not examine whether the military justice 
system provided an adequate alternative avenue of relief to persons in 
plaintiffs' position. The Court pointed94 to article 138 of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which allows a member of the 
armed forces who believes himself wronged by his commanding officer 
to complain to a superior, with the intended consequence that the of-
ficer exercising court-martial jurisdiction shall investigate the com-
plaint and "take proper measures for redressing the wrong."95 It made 
no comment upon the efficacy of this procedure as it operates in the-
ory or in practice, however. Certainly, one can imagine that camara-
derie among superior officers and other institutional forces could 
prevent appropriate follow-up of many meritorious complaints. The 
failure properly to process an aggrieved soldier's complaint may con-
stitute a deprivation of meaningful access to legislative remedies that 
renders a plaintiff's statutory remedies constitutionally inadequate or 
amounts to a denial of procedural due process.96 Even if a culpable 
superior officer were court-martialed and punished as a result of an 
article 138 complaint, that would provide little relief to the victim of 
the unconstitutional conduct. The superior officer's punishment 
would be a symbolic vindication, but it would not compensate the 
plaintiff for the harm he had suffered. Hence, punishment of the supe-
rior would not be a constitutionally adequate remedy._97 Finally, noth-
92. 103 S. Ct. at 2365-66. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-17. 
93. 103 S. Ct. at 2367. 
94. 103 S. Ct. at 2366. 
95. 10 u.s.c. § 938 (1982). 
96. See text at note 82 supra. , 
97. The Court pointed to one other intramilitary procedure whereby plaintiffs might have 
obtained some relief. 103 S. Ct. at 2367. The Board for the Correction of Naval Records, com-
posed of civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, is authorized to correct a military 
record if necessary "to correct an error or remove an injustice." 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (1982). The 
Board is also empowered to order retroactive back pay and retroactive.promotions. 10 U.S.C. 
§ 1552(c) (1982). Again, the Court made no effort to evaluate whether this procedure provided 
an adequate remedy for any, much less all, of the aspects of racial discrimination which plaintiffs 
alleged. Plaintiffs had alleged discrimination in the duties assigned them, and in threats and 
punishments administered to them, in addition to alleging discrimination in performance evalua-
tions and promotions. Even if the civilian board could have heard plaintiffs' challenges to the 
latter, it does not appear that the board had power to remedy the former alleged violations of 
plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 
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ing in article 138 entitles a member of the military to monetary 
compensation for the violation of his constitutional rights. Indeed, 
Congress has not in any statute provided a damage remedy to military 
personnel whose constitutional rights have been violated by superior 
officers. The Court made no attempt to explain why this deficiency is 
not of constitutional dimensions. 
Clearly the court was unconcerned with the adequacy of the reme-
dies Congress had provided to persons in plaintiffs' position. Yet, this 
should have been a critical issue. If the constitutional guarantees 
against racial discrimination are to have more than mythical signifi-
cance to these plaintiffs and others similarly situated there must be 
ways in which they can enforce their right not to be discriminated 
against. Had Congress provided no mechanisms whatever by which 
aggrieved servicemen could assert their grievances and obtain some 
form of relief, one would think the Court would have been compelled 
to hold that what Congress had done was constitutionally inadequate 
because the right to be free of unconstitutional discrimination would 
have been rendered meaningless to servicemen. The provision of some 
limited mechanisms for voicing grievances and for a military response 
can be constitutionally inadequate as well. Perhaps the military reme-
dies available in Chappell were adequate avenues of redress for plain-
tiff's claims, but the Court never explained why this was so, nor even 
found that it was so. In light of the Court's discussion in Carlson v. 
Green98 of the relative "ineffectiveness" and the "insufficiency" of the 
FTCA, it is not at all obvious why the remedies afforded under the 
UCMJ were constitutionally adequate in the Court's view. Indeed, for 
all its opinion reflects, the Court may have been operating upon the 
erroneous assumption that it had no duty to find that the UCMJ reme-
dies were, or were not, adequate, because of Congress' special author-
ity over military affairs. However, the fact that the Constitution 
grants Congress plenary authority over the military is no substitute for 
such an analysis. Although the body of the Constitution contains a 
textually demonstrable commitment of the military to the legislative 
branch, the rights established by the amendments to the Constitution 
are limitations on what the Congress can do in regulating the military, 
as well as on what the military can do in regulating itself. It is the 
duty of the judicial branch particularly to ensure that the rights guar-
anteed in the amendments retain at least a minimum of significance.99 
Consequently, the Court was in error in failing to evaluate the consti-
98. 446 U.S. at 20-23. See text at notes 46-50 supra. 
99. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1979); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247 
(1967). 
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tutional adequacy of the remedial schemes available to the plaintiffs in 
Chappell. 
The deference paid to Congress was particularly misplaced because 
the Court was confronted in Chappell with a situation in which there 
was not even any contention that Congress had explicitly declared that 
internal military procedures were as effective as, and intended to sub-
stitute for, Bivens actions. Under Carlson, the existence of an alterna-
tive remedial scheme will defeat implication of a Bivens cause of action 
only if Congress has made such an explicit declaration.100 Even if 
Congress had made such a declaration, the Court would have had a 
duty to pass on the constitutional adequacy of the remedies af-
forded.101 By failing to provide the federal courts with any guidance 
as to how to appraise the constitutional adequacy of a statutory 
scheme that could be used for the redress of constitutional violations, 
indeed by failing to acknowledge the necessity for the undertaking, 
while simultaneously dispensing with Carlson's prerequisites for find-
ing that congressional action precludes implication of a Bivens action, 
the Court increased the risks of under-enforcement of constitutional 
rights. The Court itself should be watching the store by verifying the 
constitutional adequacy of congressional remedies. If the Court is not 
going to do this and is instead going to defer to Congress' judgment, it 
should, at least, make clear the need for Congress itself to consider the 
constitutional adequacy of the remedies it legislates. The Court in 
Chappell did just the opposite in dispensing with the need for Congress 
to indicate any judgment concerning the constitutional adequacy of 
the legislated remedy. 
A second very disturbing aspect of Chappell is that because the 
Court was unable to rest upon the "alternative remedial scheme" bar 
to a Bivens action, it cast the military's internal system of justice as a 
special factor counselling hesitation which, taken together with the 
unique disciplinary structure of the military,102 established the impro-
priety of providing enlisted personnel a Bivens remedy against their 
superior officers. But the Court in Bivens and Carlson had indicated 
that there were two distinct situations in which a constitutionally 
based cause of action for money damages would not be recognized: 
where Congress had directed that the injured party must rely on an-
other, equally effective, remedy103 and where "special factors coun-
100. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19. 
101. See note 77 supra. 
102. Chappell, 103 S. Ct. at 2367. 
103. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397; Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19. 
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sel[led] hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. " 104 
Although it is unclear what special factors counsel hesitation, it 
should at least be clear that the existence of a legislative remedial 
scheme is not one such factor - for the existence of such legislation is 
the subject of the one other situation expressly postulated as defeating 
the implication of a Bivens remedy. In Carlson, the Court had speci-
fied just what sort of congressional action would defeat a Bivens claim. 
Not any relevant legislation would do, only legislation providing a 
cause of action that is explicitly declared to be a substitute for, and in 
Congress' view is as effective as, a Bivens remedy. In Chappel/, the 
Court retreated from the promise of Bivens and its progeny by failing 
to require of Congress what it had repeatedly indicated it would re-
quire before a Bivens claim would be defeated on the basis of congres-
sional action. The Court utterly failed to acknowledge or defend this 
retreat. Here, for the first time, the Court was faced with a congres-
sional remedial scheme covering the plaintiff which could be read to 
reflect an intent to preclude the plaintiff from having a cause of action 
for money damages under the Constitution or otherwise. Faced with 
such a statutory scheme, rather than with total congressional silence 
(as in Bivens), with a statute not covering the plaintiff (as in Davis), 10s 
or with a statute intended to be complementary to other remedies 
(such as the FTCA in Carlson), the Court must have believed that the 
test it had created for determining when congressional action would 
defeat a Bivens claim was too demanding. By not acknowledging the 
retreat it was beating, the Court avoided justifying its departure from 
the pre-ordained test. But the departure exists, and it requires justifi-
cation. Without it, the new "special factors" analysis is unacceptable. 
The requirement of a congressional directive that an injured party be 
remitted to a statutory remedy of equal efficacy before the Court will 
decline to imply a Bivens cause of action is meaningless if less suffices 
to pass the alternative test of special factors counselling hesitation. 
A related problem with Chappell' s analysis is that it takes facts 
(the unique disciplinary structure of the military) which apparently 
are insufficient to defeat a Bivens claim as a special factor counselling 
hesitation, and other facts (the remedies available to service people) 
which are insufficient to defeat a Bivens claim under the "alternative 
remedial scheme" bar, and by combining them derives a basis for 
holding it inappropriate for the Court to provide a Bivens remedy. 
104. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396; Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added). 
105. In Davis, the statute protecting federal employees did not cover those in plaintiff's job 
category. The Court refused to conclude by negative implication that Congress intended that 
those in plaintiff's position be denied all judicial remedies. 442 U.S. at 247. 
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Nowhere is it explained why the whole should be more than the sum 
of its parts. The Court's attenuation and melding of the two situations 
which Bivens held would defeat implication of a cause of action from 
the Constitution can only bode ill for future applicants for an implied 
constitutional remedy who have any alternative routes to relief, 
whether or not they are as effective as a Bivens action. 106 
It is, of course, possible that the dangers posed by the Court's 
mode of analysis in Chappell will not be realized. The question 
presented in Chappell was unique; the situations are few in which Con-
gress has plenary and exclusive authority107 upon which the Court will 
not want to impinge, and the relationship between soldier and superior 
is sui generis. However, the Court's contemporaneous decision of 
Bush v. Lucas108 suggests that the fears created by Chappell are well-
founded. 
In Bush, the Court reaffirmed the power of the federal courts to 
award damages to victims of constitutional violations in order to vin-
dicate constitutional rights, 109 but it also emphasized that that power 
is to be exercised in light of a broad range of policy considerations, 
including relevant policy determinations made by the Congress, 110 and 
106. It could be argued, contrary to the last few paragraphs, that the special factors notion 
was applied properly in Chappell The Court in Davis v. Passman had already indicated that one 
special concern counselling hesitation in implying a Bivens remedy would be interference with 
the legislative branch of the government. In Davis, the immunity afforded to congressmen by the 
speech and debate clause was enough to convince the Court that the counsel to hesitate before 
allowing a Bivens action did not have to be heeded; there was more than one way to avoid undue 
interference with the legislative branch. Arguably, the Constitution's textual commitment of the 
military to Congress raised a similar issue of separation of powers, which again counselled the 
judiciary to hesitate before affording a Bivens remedy, and here no alternative tack existed for 
avoiding undue infringement upon congressional turf; there was nothing to analogize to the 
speech and debate immunity. Hence, the Court could reason that it ought to refuse to comple-
ment the remedies available through the military justice system, not because Congress had de-
clared that system to be exclusive and as effective as Bivens claims, but because Congress' 
military justice system was made exclusive by the Constitution's commitment of military affairs 
to Congress. 
Two things should be noted about this argument. One is that, even if it is correct, the Court 
ought to have verified that the congressional remedies were constitutionally adequate. What was 
said earlier in this regard remains intact. See text of notes 69-74 supra. Second, the Court need 
not have accepted the fact that military affairs are generally within Congress' bailiwick as a 
substitute for the manifested congressional intent to deny a Bivens action to an injured party 
which the Court previously had required. A Court more concerned with the vindication of con-
stitutional rights could have afforded a Bivens remedy to Chappell, while reaffirming its complete 
willingness to respect a manifested intention by Congress that the legislative remedy be exclusive 
and preclusive, so long as the congressional remedy fulfilled constitutional minima. The Court 
did not do that in Chappel/, probably at least in part because the Court was also very reluctant to 
tamper with the special relationship between soldiers and their superiors. 
107. Congress also has plenary authority to govern the territories of the United States, for 
example. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
108. 103 s. Ct. 2404 (1983). 
109. 103 S. Ct. at 2409. 
110. 103 S. Ct. at 2409. 
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paying "particular heed" to any special factors counselling hesita-
tion. m Plaintiff Bush, an aerospace engineer employed by the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), sought money 
damages from the director of the facility where he worked, alleging 
that he had been demoted and his salary decreased in retaliation for 
his exercise of first amendment rights. 112 The Court assumed for pur-
poses of its decision that petitioner's first amendment rights had been 
violated.113 The Court further found it undisputed that Congress had 
neither expressly authorized the requested remedy nor expressly pre-
cluded the creation of such a remedy by declaring that existing stat-
utes provide the exclusive mode of redress. 114 The Court also assumed 
that the civil service remedies available to the petitioner were not as 
effective as a Bivens remedy115 and did not fully compensate him for 
the harm he had suffered. 116 The Court nonetheless ruled against 
Bush. By close analogy to Chappell the Court held that there were 
special factors counselling hesitation because Congress' expertise and 
interest in federal personnel policy117 and in civil service remedies, in 
particular, called for deference from the courts, especially where the 
remedies available were "comprehensive" and "meaningful."118 The 
Court did not find that the special relationship between the federal 
government and its civil service employees119 constituted an indepen-
111. 103 S. Ct. at 2411. 
112. 103 S. Ct. at 2406-07. 
113. 103 S. Ct. at 2408. The Court opined, however, that competent decision makers could 
reasonably disagree about that. 103 S. Ct. at 2408 n.7. 
114. 103 S. Ct. at 2408. 
115. 103 S. Ct. at 2408. In particular, Bush contended that, unlike a damages action against 
Lucas, statutory civil service remedies against the government do not provide for punitive dam-
ages or a jury trial and do not adequately deter the unconstitutional exercise of authority by 
supervisors. 103 S. Ct. at 2408 n.8. 
116. The uncompensated harms Bush pointed to were emotional and dignitary harms and his 
attorney's fees. 103 S. Ct. at 2408 n.9. 
117. 103 S. Ct. at 2412, 2417. 
118. 103 S. Ct. at 2415. 
119. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had relied on that relationship 
as a special factor counselling hesitation. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the role of the gov-
ernment as an employer toward its employees is fundamentally different from its role as sover-
eign over private citizens. This special relationship, it said, affects not only the substantive rights 
of public employees but also the ways in which aggrieved employees can assert and redress their 
grievances. At the substantive level, the government, as employer, has an interest in promoting 
the public services it performs through its employees which must be balanced against the inter-
ests of its employees, as citizens, in commenting upon matters of public concern. At the proce-
dural, remedial level, the court held that implying a Bivens remedy would tend to interfere with 
and undermine the traditional control of the government over its personnel affairs in that it 
might encourage employees to bypass statutory and administrative remedies, thereby depriving 
the government of the opportunity to resolve problems within the framework painstakingly 
worked out by Congress. This, in turn, would provide a disincentive for Congress to continue 
improving the mechanisms by which an employee can protect his rights. Bush v. Lucas, 647 
F.2d 573, 576-77 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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dent special factor counselling hesitation. The importance of the gov-
ernment-employee relation permeates its opinion, however. The 
Court commented that "the ultimate question on the merits in this 
case may appropriately be characterized as one of 'federal personnel 
policy.' " 120 In an attempt to clarify the concept of special factors, the 
Court discussed the two cases Bivens had cited as examples.121 It cast 
both as cases in which Congress' special role - in maintaining federal 
fiscal policy - had provided reason for the Court to defer to congres-
sional judgment.122 In characterizing these cases as involving congres-
sional role rather than as involving federal fiscal policy, the Court 
emphasized a different aspect of the cases than Bivens had. This new 
depiction made it appropriate for the Court to focus on whether there 
were reasons for allowing Congress alone to prescribe the scope of re-
lief available to federal civil servants whose first amendment rights had 
been violated by their supervisors. 
The Court described at length the evolution of civil service protec-
tions of civil servants' first amendment rights and the development of 
remedies enacted by Congress. It observed that Bush's first amend-
ment claims were "fully cognizable" within the system and that the 
statutory scheme provided meaningful remedies: Bush ultimately had 
received retroactive reinstatement and $30,000 in back pay.123 The 
Court characterized the question presented as "whether an elaborate 
remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with careful 
attention to conflicting policy considerations, should be augmented by 
the creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at 
issue.'' 124 Unlike the situation posed in Bivens and Davis, where the 
question was authorization of a damage remedy for a wrong that 
otherwise would go unredressed, and unlike the situation in Carlson 
where the statutory remedy was intended to complement the Bivens 
remedy, the Court was faced here with a congressionally enacted re-
medial scheme which was "elaborate," "comprehensive," afforded 
"meaningful" remedies, and was designed to provide what Congress 
regarded as full compensation.125 At the same time, that scheme was 
120. 103 S. Ct. at 2412. 
121. The two cases were United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947), and United 
States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954). 
122. 103 S. Ct. at 2412. The Court in Bush did not emphasize that in both instances the 
effect of its refusal to intervene was that the government was denied a dainages remedy which it 
sought, rather than an individual being denied a damage remedy against the government or 
government agents. 
123. 103 S. Ct. at 2415 & n.29. The administrative proceedings involving Bush are described 
in 103 S. Ct. at 2407, and the regulations applicable to him are detailed in 103 S. Ct. at 2415-16. 
124. 103 S. Ct. at 2416. 
125. 103 S. Ct. at 2417 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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not as effective as a Bivens claim, did not fully compensate the plain-
tiff, and had not been declared by Congress to provide the exclusive 
mode of redress. 126 Here, as in Chappell, the Court declined to exer-
cise its power to recognize a money damage remedy under the Consti-
tution on the ground that Congress should decide whether such a 
remedy should be provided. While the Court announced that "[t]he 
policy judgment [posed to the Court] should be informed by a thor-
ough understanding of the existing regulatory structure and the re-
spective costs and benefits that would result from the addition of 
another remedy for violations of employees' First Amendment 
rights,"127 the Court really made only a feint at reaching the necessary 
policy judgment.128 Having found it probable that a Bivens remedy 
would deter management personnel from imposing discipline for what 
they believed to be improper criticisms of the government, 129 the 
Court just threw the problem to Congress. "In all events, Congress is 
in a far better position than a court to evaluate the impact of a new 
species of litigation between federal employees on the efficiency of the 
civil service."130 
The decision in Bush is troubling in a number of aspects. First, as 
in Chappell, the Court failed to require that the statutory remedial 
scheme be equally effective in the view of Congress, much less that 
Congress declare it a substitute for a Bivens remedy, before relying on 
the existence of the scheme to defeat implication of a Bivens action. 
After Bush, a less effective remedy will suffice if the Court can find 
some reason to defer to Congress, as the Court considers such a reason 
to be a special factor counselling hesitation. Moreover, it appears that 
the Court may find such a reason whenever Congress has enacted a 
"comprehensive" legislative scheme that provides "meaningful" reme-
dies. Yet, if that suffices why would the Court in Bivens and in Carl-
son have held that a legislative remedial scheme will bar implication of 
a Bivens action only if Congress explicitly declares its scheme to be a 
substitute for a Bivens action, and views it as equally effective? As 
previously noted, that would be a superfluous standard if something 
less constitutes a special factor counselling hesitation, the alternative 
bar to implication of a Bivens action. Moreover, the argument that 
separation of powers calls for "hesitation" is here far weaker than it 
was in Chappell. The Constitution contains no textual commitment of 
126. 103 S. Ct. at 2408. 
127. 103 S. Ct. at 2416. 
128. See 103 S. Ct. at 2417. 
129. 103 S. Ct. at 2417. 
130. 103 S. Ct. at 2417. 
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federal personnel policy to Congress, and Congress is not exclusively 
concerned with federal personnel policy. Its legislation governs the 
rights of employees of the executive and judicial branches as well. 
Constitutional rights would be more secure if the Court had adhered 
to its earlier position that congressional a.ction will defeat a Bivens 
claim only if Congress has expressed its determination to foreclose the 
damages claim and has furnished another remedy, equally effective in 
its view. 
Second, (as was also true in Chappell), the Court failed to explain 
why it considered plaintiff's statutory remedies to be constitutionally 
adequate, yet it largely relied on the existence of those remedies in 
deciding against affording Bush a Bivens claim. The Court did bother 
to find that the "existing civil service remedies for a demotion in retali-
ation for protected speech are clearly constitutionally adequate."131 
Its finding appears in a footnote and consists of nothing but this con-
clusory statement. Perhaps it is "clear" that the first amendment 
rights here violated were sufficiently vindicated by this statutory 
scheme and that nothing more was required. But the lower federal 
courts and the legal community generally deserve some articulation of 
the Court's standards of adequacy to guide their decisions. This is 
particularly true in light of the Court's finding in Carlson that the 
FTCA was not an "adequate" remedy and the bases for that conclu-
sion.132 Bush contended that the statutory civil service remedies 
against the government did not provide for punitive damages or for 
jury trial and did not adequately deter the unconstitutional exercise of 
authority by supervisors. These same factors were among those upon 
which the Court and concurrors relied in Carlson in holding the 
FTCA to be neither as effective as a Bivens remedy nor a sufficient 
protector of constitutional rights. Yet the Court in Bush did not ex-
plain what, in its view, distinguished the two statutory schemes or jus-
tified its conclusion that the civil service remedies were "clearly 
constitutionally adequate." 
Third, Bush is troublesome because the Court seems to have abdi-
cated its responsibility to decide whether a remedy should be implied 
from the first amendment under the circumstances presented. It said 
that that decision should be made in light of a broad range of policy 
considerations and any special factors counselling hesitation. But in 
the very course of deciding whether Congress' role in federal personnel 
matters constituted such a "special factor," the Court seemed, uncon-
131. 103 S. Ct. at 2411 n.14. 
132. See text at notes 46-50 and note 77 supra. 
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sciously, to shift its attention to whether a damage remedy should ex-
ist. It decided that Congress was better able than a court to decide 
that question. If so here, why not always, given Congress' ubiquitous 
ability to inform itself through fact-finding procedures not available to 
the courts? What has become of the once clearly discernible message 
of the Constitution that the judiciary should be the primary means 
through which constitutional rights are enforced?133 In its ostensibly 
"conservative" desire to defer to Congress on all remedial matters, the 
Court abdicated its responsibility. 
The Court's deferential stance seriously increases the risk that con-
stitutional rights will be less enforceable than the Constitution re-
quires. By failing to provide guidance to the lower courts on the 
appropriate standard for judging the constitutional adequacy of statu-
tory remedial schemes, indeed, by failing even to address the adequacy 
of the statutory scheme in Chappell, the Court has signalled the lower 
courts that they need not consider whether legislated alternatives to 
Bivens remedies meet constitutional minima.134 The danger thus 
133. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1979). 
134. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has considered the adequacy of available remedies 
in order to determine whether a particular cause of action may be asserted. For example, in 
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), the Court held that the negligent deprivation ofplaintitrs 
property by a state official did not constitute a violation of procedural due process actionable 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in part because there was an adequate state remedy available to plaintiff. 
The Court went on to find that the state had provided plaintiff with adequate means to receive 
redress for the deprivation he had suffered. 451 U.S. at 543. The argument was made that the 
state statutory law did not adequately protect plaintifi's interests because it provided only for an 
action against the state and not against its individual employees, did not provide for punitive 
damages, and afforded no right to trial by jury. 451 U.S. at 543-44. The Court responded that 
"(a]lthough the state remedies may not provide the respondent with all the relief which may have 
been available if he could have proceeded under§ 1983, that does not mean that the state reme· 
dies are not adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process. The remedies provided could 
have fully compensated the respondent for the property loss he suffered, and we hold that they 
are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process." 451 U.S. at 544. Justice Marshall, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, would have held the state law remedy inadequate, not 
because of any shortcomings in the tort claims procedure, but because prison officials had failed 
to inform plaintiff, whose access to information about his legal rights was necessarily limited by 
his confinement, of the remedies available under state law. 451 U.S. at 555-56. 
In subsequent cases the Court shed additional light on the adequacy of state remedies as a 
matter of procedural due process. For example, in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 
422 (1982), the Court held a post-deprivation hearing to be constitutionally inadequate when the 
only available process was an independent tort action. "Seeking redress through a tort suit is apt 
to be a lengthy and speculative process, which in a situation such as this one will never make the 
complainant entirely whole: the Illinois Court of Claims Act does not provide for reinstatement 
. . . and even a successful suit will not vindicate entirely Logan's right to be free from discrimi-
natory treatment." 455 U.S. at 436-37. An intentional deprivation of property was held not to 
violate the due process clause in Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3197 n.1, 3204 (1984), 
because post-deprivation state court actions for conversion or detinue were adequate. See also 
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984) (in § 1983 actions, federal courts 
should afford neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel effect to awards in arbitration proceed-
ings brought pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement because arbitration is not an adequate 
substitute for judicial proceedings in protecting the federal statutory and constitutional rights 
that§ 1983 is designed to safeguard); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 
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posed to constitutional rights is heightened still further by the Court's 
new willingness to defer to alternative statutory remedies that are 
neither explicitly declared to be substitutes for, nor are in Congress' 
view as effective as, Bivens actions. First the Court abdicated its re-
sponsibility to ensure that legislated remedial schemes meet constitu-
tional minima, then the Court invited Congress as well not to consider 
the adequacy of its legislation. Precisely the opposite should occur: to 
the extent that the Court defers to Congress' judgment that a remedy 
is constitutionally adequate, the Court should emphasize the need for 
Congress to address the adequacy of its legislated remedies. 
II. RAMIFICATIONS FOR FIRST AMENDMENT BIVENS ACTIONS 
Having criticized the Supreme Court's two latest Bivens cases in 
Part I above, the Article in this section explains why a Bivens action 
ordinarily should lie for violation of the first amendment to the Consti-
tution and illustrates the implications of Bush and Chappell for such 
actions. First amendment Bivens cases were chosen as the focus of 
discussion because of the particular significance of the guarantees of 
freedom of speech, press and religion, and because of the author's par-
ticular interest in nontraditional uses of the first amendment. 135 
A. The Case for First Amendment Bivens Actions Generally 
The first amendment to the Constitution mandates that the free-
dom of speech, of the press and of the people peaceably to assemble 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances not be 
100 (1981) (doctrine of equitable restraint bars taxpayers' actions in federal court, under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the constitutionality of state tax laws; taxpayers must seek protection 
of their federal rights by state remedies, provided those remedies are plain, adequate, and com-
plete). 
The principle of adequacy to be derived from these cases taken together is not evident, how-
ever, and the relevance of these cases to the constitutional adequacy of congressional remedial 
schemes said to supplant Bivens actions is unclear. None of the foregoing cases was cited in Bush 
or Chappell. Parrott, Logan, and Hudson all had to do with whether the existence of a post-
deprivation hearing satisfied due process or whether only a pre-deprivation hearing would do, a 
question quite unlike that presented in Bush, Chappell and the other Bivens actions discussed 
later in this Article. Indeed, it is generally held that Pa"att is not applicable to violations of 
substantive constitutional rights, such as the first amendment. See, e.g., Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 
699 F.2d 864, 871-72 (7th Cir. 1983) (fourth amendment claim); Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 
1220, 1225 (4th Cir. 1983) (fourth amendment claim), affd. in part, revd. in part, 104 S. Ct. 3194 
(1984). Similarly, the comity issue presented in McNary is plainly distinguishable from the ade-
quacy issue that arises in Bivens actions. In light of the Supreme Court's failure to invoke any of 
the foregoing cases and their facial differences from Bivens actions, no effort will be made here to 
reconcile the § 1983 actions with each other or with the Court's statements on adequacy in 
Carlson v. Green. If and when the Court grapples with the question of adequacy in the Bivens 
context, perhaps it will advert to these § 1983 cases. 
135. See Steinman, Privacy of Association: A Burgeoning Privilege in Civil Discovery, 17 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 355 (1982). 
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abridged by the federal government, and that Congress make no law 
prohibiting the free exercise of religion or respecting an establishment 
of religion. 136 The amendment thus creates duties in the government, 
and bestows correlative rights upon the people of the United States. 
For this amendment to be more than a mere exhortation, some remedy 
or remedies must be available should government agents violate its 
strictures or threaten to do so. Saying this does not imply that the 
remedy afforded always must include money damages payable by 
wrongdoing officials. Declaratory judgments establishing the rights of 
people and the obligations of the government and injunctive relief 
prohibiting or requiring specified governmental action - the most 
common tools for enforcing first amendment rights - have unques-
tionably put teeth into the first amendment for many people in many 
circumstances. 
Nonetheless, these traditional judicial responses to violations of 
first amendment rights often are insufficient to remedy the harm done. 
Rarely, if ever, will declaratory or injunctive relief for the future make 
up for a past injury. If a victim has the right to be made whole, 137 the 
Constitution requires not only a prospective remedy but coercive re-
lief, 138 a money damage remedy. Thus, as the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized, 139 a monetary award is necessary to make the victim whole 
when the violation lies in a subsequent punishment or retaliation for 
the past exercise of first amendment rights. 140 Similarly, when first 
amendment rights are violated by suppression, a private damages ac-
tion often affords the only practicable means of redressing the wrong 
done. 141 Governmental action which stifles speech until after the most 
propitious moments have slipped into history inflicts injuries that no 
later opportunities for the speech can cure.142 Only money damages 
can provide some recompense. An award of money damages also 
136. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
137. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 783 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) ("To the extent 
that the Court denies an otherwise appropriate remedy, it denies the victim the right to be made 
whole and, therefore, denies him 'the protection of the laws.' "). 
138. See Monaghan, First Amendment ''Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 548 (1970). 
139. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) ("In situations of abuse of office, an 
action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guaran· 
tees."); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) ("an action for damages against the respon· 
sible official can be an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees"). 
140. While money awarded under the rubric of back pay is, for some purposes, characterized 
as restitutionary or equitable relief and not technically speaking money damages recoverable at 
law, see, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974), it constitutes backward-looking, 
compensatory relief rather than solely forward-looking, injury-deterring declaratory or injunctive 
relief, and is encompassed within the awards advocated in this Article. 
141. Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035, 1040 (D. Hawaii 1973). 
142. See text at notes 342-45 infra. 
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serves as a forceful statement of the society's fundamental public val-
ues and may deter similar governmental wrongdoing in the future. 
As the Court pointed out in Bivens, compensatory damages are a 
remedial mechanism normally available in the federal courts. 143 They 
historically have been the ordinary remedy to redress an invasion of 
personal interests in liberty. Certainly, first amendment liberty inter-
ests are no less important than the fourth amendment liberty interests 
that Bivens held to support a money damage remedy. 144 They even 
share common roots in safeguarding privacy, conscience and human 
dignity. 145 Recognition of a Bivens remedy to safeguard the freedoms 
of speech and association and the freedom to exercise religious beliefs 
is comfortably within common law tradition. As Professor Peter 
Schuck of the Yale Law School recently wrote, 
This compensation principle seems to the classical and contemporary 
mind alike so manifestly fair, so palpably just that it borders on the self-
evident and axiomatic. . . . To say that government should pay its way 
and bear the costs of its transgressions is like saying that people should 
tell the truth, earn their keep, and pay their debts. 146 
The courts unquestionably act within their legitimate institutional 
role in awarding damages to redress violations of constitutional 
rights. 147 Money damages are the courts' stock-in-trade. As some of 
the cases discussed below will demonstrate, the courts are clearly com-
petent to place a dollar value on first amendment injuries. Moreover, 
the courts are, and are intended by the Constitution to be, the branch 
of government primarily responsible for enforcing the duties imposed 
by the Bill of Rights upon the government. 148 As Justice Harlan said, 
concurring in Bivens, "[T]he judiciary has a particular responsibility to 
143. 403 U.S. at 395. 
144. The decisions are legion in which the Supreme Court had recognized that first amend-
ment rights are fundamental components of liberty, essential to the preservation of democracy. 
See, e.g., First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 (1978); Gibson v. Florida Legislative 
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-27 
(1937); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373, 375-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
145. Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035, 1039-40 & n.8 (D. Hawaii 1973). See Stan-
ford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1965) (quoting approvingly Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 
360, 376 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)) ("These three amendments [the first, fourth, and fifth] 
are indeed closely related, safeguarding not only privacy and protection against self-incrimina-
tion but 'conscience and human dignity and freedom of expression as well.' "). 
146. P. SCHUCK, supra note 69, at 112. 
147. A credible and fair legal system should stand ready to remedy every significant inva-
sion of rights; citizens injured by officials who violate established legal standards should be 
made whole. Errant officials should be obliged to pay for their transgressions, encouraging 
them to be more law-abiding, careful, and solicitous of the public they serve. Courts should 
enforce these obligations. 
Id. at 1. 
148. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1979); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 
247 (1967). 
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assure the vindication of constitutional interests . [T]he Bill of 
Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the interests of the individ-
ual in the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative majori-
ties .... " 149 These principles apply with particular force to the 
vindication of first amendment rights because the first amendment is 
particularly aimed at protecting the politically unpopular. 150 The spe-
cial sensitivity of the federal courts to first amendment rights makes 
them best suited to vindicate those interests. m The vindication of first 
amendment rights should be left neither to Congress nor to the vagar-
ies of state law. 152 
Of the Bivens-type cases that have been decided by the Supreme 
Court, four have arisen, in whole or in part, under the first amend-
ment. While the Court has not in any of them recognized an implied 
right of action for damages for violation of the first amendment, the 
Court has not indicated that it would not do so, in a proper case. In-
deed, by proceeding to the question whether special factors counselled 
against recognition of just such a cause of action in Bush v. Lucas, 153 
and by proceeding to the issue of immunities in Butz v. Economou, 154 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald155 and Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 156 the Court has im-
plied that there may be occasions when it would be appropriate to 
recognize a Bivens action to remedy first amendment violations. 
The foregoing is not intended to suggest that in all circumstances, 
149. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
150. Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp. at 1041. 
151. Monaghan, supra note 138, at 551. 
152. Damages are, of course, recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation offirst 
amendment rights by persons acting under color of state law. See, e.g., Berdin v. Duggan, 701 
F.2d 909 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 239 (1983) (alleging retaliatory discharge); Brown 
v. Bullard Indep. School Dist., 640 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828 (1983) 
(alleging retaliatory refusal to renew contract); Brule v. Southworth, 611 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 197,) 
(alleging retaliatory suspension of prison employees); McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 
1979) (alleging retaliatory transfer of prisoner); Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979) (alleging retaliatory transfer of jailhouse lawyer). Federal offi-
cials should be held no Jess accountable than their state counterparts. See Butz v. Economou, 
438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (''The§ 1983 action was provided to vindicate federal constitutional 
rights .... To create a system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct of 
state officials than it does that of federal officials is to stand the constitutional design on its 
head."). 
153. 103 s. Ct. 2404, 2409-12 (1983). 
154. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). See note 23 supra. 
155. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
156. 457 U.S. 731 (1982). The district courts in Harlow and Nixon had upheld the legal 
sufficiency of first amendment Bivens claims. The Supreme Court took jurisdiction in each in-
stance only to resolve questions of immunity, under the collateral order doctrine. Harlow, 457 
U.S. at 820 n.36. In Harlow, the Court said that the legal sufficiency of plaintill's first amend-
ment Bivens action was therefore not properly presented for decision. 457 U.S. at 805 n.10. In 
Nixon, the Court assumed, for purposes of its opinion, that private causes of action may be 
inferred under the first amendment. 457 U.S. at 748 n.27. 
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without exception, a money damage remedy arising directly under the 
Constitution should be afforded if someone's first amendment rights 
have been violated and he properly requests such a remedy. There 
may be exceptional occasions when "special factors" will counsel 
against the allowance of such a remedy or "exclusive" remedies cre-
ated by Congress will so adequately compensate the victim of a consti-
tutional tort and attest to our commitment to first amendment values 
that no additional judicially created remedy will be necessary or ap-
propriate. But in many instances the Courts should recognize a first 
amendment Bivens claim. In the pages that follow, the Article evalu-
ates the lower federal courts' handling of first amendment Bivens cases 
and illustrates the implications of the Supreme Court's recent retreat 
in Chappell v. Wallace and Bush v. Lucas. 
B. First Amendment Cases in the Lower Federal Courts 
Under Chappell and Bush, the presence of broad remedial legisla-
tion will have a significant effect on the outcome of first amendment 
Bivens cases. In Part 1 below, the Article discusses purported first 
amendment Bivens actions based on violations which, like that alleged 
in Chappell, arose in a military context, or, like that in Bush, arose in 
the context of federal employment. It is in such cases that Chappell 
and Bush are likely to have the greatest impact. The Article explores 
recent cases whose outcomes have been affected, and some earlier deci-
sions upon which doubt has been cast, by Chappell and Bush. It dem-
onstrates how these two cases increase the risk that the first 
amendment rights of servicemen and federal employees will be insuffi-
ciently protected. 
In Part 2 below, attention shifts to proposed first amendment Biv-
ens cases brought by members of the public whose claims had nothing 
to do with military service or federal employment. These claims arose 
out of government conduct that was not the subject of remedial federal 
legislation. Congress had been silent. The Article explains why the 
Supreme Court's reasoning in Chappell and Bush should have little 
impact in these cases. It then assesses the lower courts' decisions in 
the light of the Supreme Court's earlier Bivens decisions and this Arti-
cle's argument in favor of first amendment Bivens claims. 
1. When Congress Has Spoken 
a. Alleged violations of the rights of military personnel. Over the 
years, several Bivens actions have been brought against individual 
commanding officers and civilians whose decisions allegedly violated 
the constitutional rights of servicemen and their spouses. Mollnow v. 
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Carlton, 157 decided in September, 1983, by the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit (whose opinion in Chappell had been reversed), is a 
prime example of the detrimental effect of Chappell on the ability of 
military personnel to maintain a suit to recover damages from superior 
officers for violations of first amendment rights. Mollnow was an of-
ficer and pilot in the U.S. Air Force and Air Force Reserve. He al-
leged a conspiracy to have him removed from flight duty and 
ultimately from the service because of allegedly accurate reports he 
had submitted concerning unsafe conditions and policies in the opera-
tion of heavy aircraft. He claimed that his reports had been sup-
pressed and that he had been imprisoned in a psychiatric ward to 
prevent him from testifying about a crash which, he said, occurred 
precisely as he had predicted. Mollnow argued that the court had to 
look to the adequacy of the remedy available to him under the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) before dismissing his Bivens 
claim, and that there was, in fact, no adequate statutory remedy for 
him, in part because his access to UCMJ remedies had been blocked. 
The court held that neither inadequacy of the remedies available to the 
plaintiff under the UCMJ nor the refusal by Mollnow's commanding 
officers to act on his grievances, which allegedly had prevented him 
from seeking redress under the UCMJ, sufficed to distinguish Chap-
pell Reading Chappell to impose a per se prohibition on Bivens actions 
by servicemen against their superiors, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal of Mollnow's complaint.15s 
If one assumes the factual allegations of Mollnow's complaint to be 
true, as one must for purposes of deciding whether he has stated a 
constitutional claim for which a damage remedy ought to be provided, 
and if one further assumes that Mollnow's first amendment rights 
were violated, then the decision of the Ninth Circuit has rendered the 
constitutional guarantee of free speech a meaningless form of words 
for Mollnow. If his allegations are true, the reports for which he was 
punished were of considerable public interest. The actions alleged to 
have been taken against Mollnow, in retaliation for his reports and to 
suppress his further speech, were severe. The inaction of Mollnow's 
superior officers was alleged to have prevented him from obtaining any 
redress through intra-service procedures. The Ninth Circuit's denial 
157. 716 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1595 (1984). 
158. 716 F.2d at 629-30. Under article 138 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 938, Mollnow was 
entitled to confront his commanding officer with his complaints. If he was refused redress, he 
could then forward a "Complaint of Wrongs" to any superior commissioned officer who, in turn, 
would notify the appropriate officials to investigate the propriety of a court martial. Mollnow 
alleged that he made repeated "Complaint[s] of Wrongs," and that all were ignored by every 
officer up through the chain of command. 
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of relief, upon a finding of "no room in Chappell to consider the ade-
quacy of the intraservice remedy," 159 is an abdication of judicial re-
sponsibility to safeguard first amendment rights. However sufficient 
military justice may be in theory or for other servicemen and women, 
Mollnow appears to be a case where the denial of meaningful access 
rendered plaintiffs statutory remedy constitutionally inadequate.160 If 
so, Mollnow was entitled to a direct action under the Constitution, 
unless special factors not considered by the Ninth Circuit would dic-
tate otherwise. The court of appeals was correct to see in Chappell no 
indication that an inquiry into the minimal adequacy of the system of 
military justice was necessary. The Supreme Court, by its failure to 
make clear the necessity for such an inquiry, invited decisions such as 
this, to the harm of military personnel like Mollnow.16 1 
A second case relying upon Chappell to deny recovery is Gaspard 
v. United States. 162 The suit was brought by men who, under military 
orders, took part in atmospheric atomic weapons tests during the 
1950's, and claimed to have developed serious, painful illnesses as a 
result of their exposure to radiation. One of the plaintiffs had died, 
allegedly from the exposure. In addition to suing under the FTCA 
and filing claims with the Veterans Administration, they alleged viola-
tions of their constitutional rights under several amendments, includ-
ing the first. 163 
After denying their FTCA claims on the basis of the Feres doc-
trine, 164 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of 
their Bivens claims. It relied upon Chappell in reasoning that because 
constitutional claims of armed forces personnel are meant to be cov-
ered by the Veterans' Benefits Act (VBA), 165 a money damages rem-
159. 716 F.2d at 630. 
160. See Clemente v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 1150, 1164-71 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (plaintiff 
entitled to recover both compensatory and punitive damages in a Bivens action because her due 
process rights were violated when the Air Force ignored some of her administrative claims and 
disposed of her discrimination claim in a grossly inadequate and highly superficial manner, all in 
disregard of Air Force procedures). 
161. See also Grace v. United States Pub. Health Serv., 714 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1414 (1984) (Chappell bars physician's Bivens claim for wrongful termination 
from residency program. See 52 U.S.L.W. 3628 (Feb. 28, 1984).); Benvenuti v. Department of 
Defense, 587 F. Supp. 348, 353 (D.D.C. 1984) (Chappell bars junior officer's Bivens action alleg-
ing a due process violation in conjunction with what plaintiff characterized as "involuntary com-
mitments"); Penagaricano v. Llenza, 571 F. Supp. 888, 892 (D.P.R. 1983) (dismissing a first 
amendment Bivens action alleging a conspiracy to separate plaintiff from his position in the Pu-
erto Rico National Guard on account of his political ideas, in part in reliance upon Chappell). 
162. 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2354 (1984). 
163. 713 F.2d at 1100 & n.6. 
164. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). See note 89 supra. 
165. Under the Veterans' Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1982), a soldier injured inci-
dent to military service is assured free medical care, and receives limited income if he is disabled 
304 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:269 
edy directly under the Constitution is unavailable. 166 The court either 
ignored the question whether the remedy made available by the VBA 
was minimally adequate to redress the alleged constitutional violations 
or it assumed without analysis that the VBA afforded a constitution-
ally adequate remedy to servicemen generally, and to plaintiffs in par-
ticular. As cases discussed below show, this is a matter not free of 
doubt. 167 Perhaps the court regarded its view that the VBA remedies 
were meant to be exclusive168 as tantamount to a determination of 
constitutional adequacy. There is no warrant for such an assumption, 
however. 169 Because of the failure to think through the matter of con-
stitutional adequacy, here, as in Chappell, plaintiffs' constitutional 
rights were insufficiently protected. 
Gaspard also alleged that he was entitled to a Bivens action, even if 
the VBA is generally an adequate remedy, because the Veterans Ad-
ministration (VA) refused to certify his particular injury as service-
related and therefore refused to grant him a service-related pension. 170 
The court's conclusion that denial of the VA pension did not provide a 
ground for affording a Bivens remedy was justified by its finding that 
Gaspard's alleged injuries could be remedied adequately through the 
available statutory scheme if he could prove that his disabilities were 
service-related.171 However, its language, "We consider the congres-
sionally-authorized military compensation system to be comprehen-
sive and conclusive even when individual claimants may fall between 
the cracks of the implementing regulations,"172 is overbroad. For one 
who falls between the cracks because he cannot prove elements of the 
statutory cause which are not necessary to a cause of action under the 
Constitution, the legislative scheme furnishes no remedy, and the fail-
after discharge and limited income for his family if he dies as a result of his injury. The Act 
provides special supplementary payments for loss of use of a limb or an eye, and for other serious 
military injuries. Its specific provisions include:§§ 301-362: compensation for service-connected 
disability or death; §§ 401-423: dependency and indemnity compensation for service-connected 
deaths; §§ 501-562: pensions for nonservice-connected disability or death; §§ 601-664: hospital, 
domiciliary, nursing home, and medical care;§§ 701-788: life insurance. The court in Gaspard 
did not specify precisely what VBA benefits plaintiffs sought. 
166. Gaspard, 713 F.2d at 1103. 
167. See Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1236 n.11 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982); Stanley v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 474, 487-88 (S.D. Fla. 1983), 
scrivener's errors corrected by subsequent order at 581 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D. Fla. 1984). 
168. Gaspard, 713 F.2d at 1102, 1105. 
169. See note 191 and text at notes 204-06, infra. 
170. 713 F.2d at 1104-05. 
171. The court noted that a wrongful denial of VA pensions that rose to the level of a consti-
tutional violation could support a separate Bivens theory. Such a claim was not before the court, 
however. 713 F.2d at 1105 nn.18-19. 
172. 713 F.2d at 1105 (citation omitted). 
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ure to recognize a direct action under the Constitution can leave its 
guarantees a "mere form of words."173 
A very similar case was presented to the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals in 1981, and was resolved in the same way as Gaspard, in a 
decision which foreshadowed Chappell to a remarkable degree. In Jaf-
fee v. United States114 the Third Circuit en bane denied a former sol-
dier and his wife a Bivens cause of action against former commanding 
officers and civilian members of the Defense Department and the 
Atomic Energy Commission. Defendants were accused of having 
knowingly, deliberately and recklessly disregarded their knowledge 
that they were exposing plaintiff and other soldiers to grave risk of 
injury and death in ordering them to stand in a field without any pro-
tection against radiation while a nuclear device was exploded a short 
distance away. Jaffee sued seeking compensatory and punitive dam-
ages for violation of his consitutional rights under several amend-
ments, including the first.11s 
The Third Circuit viewed its task as that of divining what the 
Supreme Court would do with the case.176 It correctly foresaw that 
the Court would apply the reasoning behind the military immunity 
doctrine created by Feres v. United States111 to the question whether a 
cause of action to redress allegedly unconstitutional military acts 
should be implied under the Constitution against individual govern-
ment offi.cials.178 The court found that special factors would counsel 
hesitation, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, because of the deleterious 
effects that the Court perceives service related lawsuits to have on mil-
itary performance.179 It found that permitting suits for intentional 
torts would likely undermine military discipline as much as allowing 
suits for the negligent conduct from which the Supreme Court had 
173. See text at note 79 supra. 
174. 663 F.2d 1226, 1228, 1238 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982). 
175. 663 F.2d at 1229. He also alleged violations of his fourth, fifth, eighth and ninth 
amendment rights. 
176. 663 F.2d at 1228, 1230. This approach is highly questionable and was criticized both by 
concurring judges and by the dissenters as neither sound policy nor sound jurisprudence. They 
argued that it was the court's responsibility to arrive at an independent decision based on rea-
soned analysis of legal precepts and precedents. 663 F.2d at 1240 (Hunter, III, J. concurring), 
1267 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). See Note, Interstate Commerce-State Franchise Tax on Foreign 
Corporation Engaged Solely in Interstate Commerce, 44 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 565, 569-70 (1944). 
177. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
178. The Supreme Court fulfilled this prediction in Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362 
(1983). 
179. Jaffee, 663 F.2d at 1232, 1234-36. These include ill effects on the willingness of military 
personnel to follow directions of their superiors, and ill effects on the willingness of military 
decision makers to act as quickly and forcefully as necessary if they know that they subsequently 
may be called into a civilian court to answer for their actions. 
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immunized military personnel in Feres and elsewhere,180 and that the 
type of military activity which could give rise to a claim of intentional 
tort is particularly dependent on the exercise of discretionary military 
judgment. It found that no distinction between battlefield and non-
battlefield decisions was appropriate. 181 The court relied, moreover, 
on the assumption (made by the Court in Carlson v. Green) that suits 
against individuals have "far greater potential for chilling responsible 
decision-making than those against the government."182 For these 
reasons the Third Circuit believed that the Supreme Court would hold 
special factors to counsel against recognition of a Bivens remedy for 
Jaffee or his wife. 
In a manner which further foreshadowed the Supreme Court's ap-
proach in Chappell, the court went on to conclude that although the 
VBA did not provide as effective a remedy as recovery directly under 
the Constitution, 183 and although Congress had not declared the Act 
to be an equally effective substitute, 184 the Act nonetheless reinforced 
the decision not to recognize a Bivens cause of action. While the Act 
would not in itself preclude a cause of action for money damages 
under the Constitution, it joined with the concerns about the effect of 
lawsuits on the military to counsel against creation of such a cause of 
action, as the choice for Jaffee was not "damages or nothing."185 
Finally, the court rejected the argument that the civilian defen-
dants from the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Com-
mission should not benefit from the concerns expressed in Feres. In 
the court's view, the same policy considerations were implicated 
whether injurious decisions were made by military officials or by civil-
ian officials who oversee military operations.186 Thus, no Bivens claim 
180. 663 F.2d at 1234-35. The court also relied here upon Stencel Aero Engg. v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). 
181. 663 F.2d at 1236-37. 
182. 663 F.2d at 1234. 
183. The court noted that veterans' benefits clearly would not fully compensate Jaffee for his 
losses and that deterrence of similar future behavior by federal employees "would occur only if 
the government punished wrongdoers through administrative or criminal sanctions." 663 F.2d 
at 1236 n.11. 
184. The court observed, however, that the Supreme Court had interpreted the VBA admin· 
istrative remedy to be "exclusive" in a different context. 663 F.2d at 1237 (citing Hatzlachh 
Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1980) (per curiam)). And it read Congress' 
silence, in the face of the Court's invitation to Congress to amend the FICA if it disagreed with 
Peres, as indicative of congressional intent that the government be free from tort liability for 
service connected injuries. 663 F.2d at 1237. The court further seemed to assume that congres· 
sional intent on whether injured servicemen ought to be able to sue the United States is 
equivalent to congressional intent on whether servicemen ought to be able to sue their command· 
ing officers in tort. This is a questionable assumption. 
185. 663 F.2d at 1236-37. 
186. 663 F.2d at 1238. 
November 1984] First Amendment Bivens Actions 307 
was allowed against the civilians either. 
As already noted, Jaffee anticipated Chappell It correctly pre-
dicted the Supreme Court's analysis. Consequently many of the criti-
cisms which this Article levelled against Chappell apply to Jaffee. In 
short, the decision is troublesome for its attenuation and melding of 
the two tests which the Court previously had developed for determin-
ing whether a Bivens claim would be implied, 187 and for its lack of 
concern with affording the plaintiff a constitutionally adequate rem-
edy. With respect to the court's reliance on the Feres doctrine, two 
dissenting judges argued strenuously against the notion that military 
necessity demanded that the Bivens action be rejected. They reviewed 
case law to show that the court's decision was instead a radical break 
with the traditions of holding the military accountable to civil govern-
ment, of denying absolute immunity to military officers, and of en-
couraging members of the armed forces to complain of misconduct by 
their commanding officers.188 The dissenters also decried the major-
ity's use of the policy favoring aggressiveness in military decisionmak-
ing to bar actions by civilians for intentional torts committed by the 
military;189 here Mrs. Jaffee's claims,190 predicated on the violation of 
her husband's constitutional rights, were dismissed as well.191 
A recent district court decision, Stanley v. United States, 192 has 
shown a way in which Chappell can be read not to impose a per se 
187. See text at notes 102-06 supra. 
188. 663 F.2d at 1247-68 (Gibbons, J., and Sloviter, J., dissenting). See note 89 supra. 
189. 663 F.2d at 1250 (Gibbons, J., and Sloviter, J., dissenting). 
190. Mrs. Gaspard's claims were likewise dismissed as requiring an impermissible inquiry 
into military affairs. Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d at 1104. 
191. The dissent also attacked the concurring judges' reasoning that the denial of a Bivens 
cause of action was defensible on the ground that Congress viewed the compensation system 
provided by the VBA as an adequate remedy. The dissent showed that the concurring judges 
had misread both legislative history and case law. Congress intended the VBA statutory pro-
gram to provide reasonable and adequate compensation to disabled veterans facing rising infla-
tion, but Congress never even considered the statute in the context of disabled veterans who 
claimed that their injuries were the product of unconstitutional conduct by their superior officers. 
663 F.2d at 1263. Similarly, the dictum the concurrors relied on, in which the Supreme Court 
stated that it understood that Congress intended the VBA to be the sole remedy for service 
connected injuries, Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 464 (1980) (per 
curiam), was uttered in the context of rejecting a claim against the United States by an alleged 
tortfeasor who sought indemnity. The Supreme Court's opinion clearly assumed that servicemen 
could sue third parties despite service and veteran benefit programs. Thus, the Court's opinion 
supported, rather than undermined, the precedential basis for a Bivens action against command-
ing officers. 663 F.2d at 1264. The critical point is this: If the dissenters are correct that Con-
gress never intended the VBA to be veterans' exclusive remedy, and never intended the Act to 
preclude veterans from suing persons other than the United States, then the court was free to 
afford a Bivens remedy even if the VBA renders the Bill of Rights something more than a "mere 
form of words." 
192. 574 F. Supp. 474 (S.D. Fla. 1983), scrivener's errors co"ected by subsequent order at 587 
F. Supp. 1071 (S.D. Fla. 1984). 
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prohibition on Bivens actions by servicemen against their superiors. 
Stanley is worth contrasting with Mollnow, Gaspard, and Jaffee for 
although it was brought under the fifth amendment, its reasoning and 
analysis would be equally appropriate in a first amendment Bivens 
case. 
While in the Army, plaintiff Stanley participated in a program the 
purported purpose of which was to develop and test methods of de-
fense against chemical warfare attacks. 193 Stanley alleged that the mil-
itary surreptitiously administered LSD to him, and that the LSD 
caused a wide range of injuries, from alterations in his behavioral and 
emotional state to the consequent impairment of his performance of 
military duties and the dissolution of his marriage.194 The court iden-
tified the fifth amendment right to be free to decide for oneself whether 
to submit to drug therapy as the source of his Bivens action, 195 
although plaintiff's first amendment rights were implicated as well. '96 
Distinguishing Chappell, the Stanley court reaffirmed its earlier deci-
sion 197 that the plaintiff had a viable Bivens action against individual 
agents and officers of the United States who had participated in the 
LSD experiment. The Stanley court did not read Chappell to hold the 
Constitution's textual commitment of the military to Congress to be a 
matter of separation of powers that was itself a special factor counsel-
ling hesitation. It relied upon the Court's (obscure but) explicit refusal 
to hold that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian 
courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military ser-
vice, 198 and upon the Court's having "found it necessary" to deter-
mine whether special factors counselling hesitation were present on 
the particular facts of Chappell Those two aspects of Chappell led the 
Stanley court to conclude that Chappell did not impose a per se prohi-
bition on Bivens actions by servicemen against their superiors, but 
rather barred only those actions "in which a member of the military 
brings suit against a superior officer for wrongs which involve direct 
193. 574 F. Supp. at 476 & n.1. 
194. 574 F. Supp. at 476 & n.2. 
195. 574 F. Supp. at 476 n.1. 
196. See, e.g., Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976) (first amendment may be violated 
by the involuntary administration of psychotherapeutic substances to inmates); see also Rogers v. 
Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1366-67 (D.Mass. 1979), affd. in part, revd. in part, 634 F.2d 650, 653 
(1st Cir. 1980), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) (district 
court found first amendment concerns implicated when patients alleged forcible administration 
of antipsychotic drugs; court of appeals relied upon the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment, and did not examine the district court's reliance on the first amendment. See Mills 
v. Rogers, 457 U.S. at 294 n.3, 295-96 n.6.). 
197. Stanley v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Fla. 1982). 
198. Chappell, 103 S. Ct. at 2367. 
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orders in the performance of military duty and the discipline and or-
der necessary thereto." 199 Stanley had not been ordered or obligated 
to participate in the program giving rise to his complaint. He had 
volunteered, in service to his country, so his case did not require the 
court to inquire into the propriety of military orders. 200 Conse-
quently, neither Chappell nor the Feres doctrine dictated denial of a 
Bivens action to Stanley, and both Gaspard and Jaffee were distin-
guishable. Special factors counselling hesitation were thus found not 
to be present. 201 
After noting the existence of ample common law and statutory au-
thority to support judicial review of Stanley's constitutional claim,202 
and after remarking upon the obligation of the military to operate 
within the confines of the Bill of Rights, the court went on to decide 
that Stanley's Bivens action was not precluded by a legislative remedy. 
Consistent with its view that Congress' authority over the military did 
not constitute a special factor counselling hesitation, the court looked 
for an alternative legislated remedy explicitly declared to be a substi-
tute for recovery under the Constitution and equally effective in the 
view of Congress, using the literal Carlson test. The court first found 
that an award of retroactive back pay and promotions, theoretically 
available from a civilian board empowered to correct military records, 
would be "meaningless" for Stanley. He did not claim that the Army 
had cheated him of either money or a promotion. He alleged that the 
Army had caused him mental illness and physical pain, and knowingly 
deprived him of the ability to enjoy his life.203 The court also held that 
the VBA did not pass either prong of the Carlson test for concluding 
that a statutory remedy precludes implication of a Bivens remedy. 
Neither the statutory language of the VBA nor its legislative history 
explicitly declares that the VBA is to substitute for a Bivens action. 204 
At most, the court found, Congress intended the Act to provide relief 
199. Stanley, 574 F. Supp. at 479. 
200. 574 F. Supp. at 479, 481. 
201. Cf. Bishop v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 66, 68 (D.D.C. 1983) (rejecting Bivens claims, 
predicated upon the first, fifth and other amendments to the Constitution, by a former soldier 
who had voluntarily participated in drug experiments conducted by the Army; without discus-
sion, the court found that Chappell barred the action). 
202. Stanley, 574 F. Supp. 474, 479, 481-82 & 481 nn.13-16. 
203. 574 F. Supp. at 485. The court went too far here because Stanley had alleged that the 
LSD administered to him had impaired his military performance, prompting a reduction in his 
service rank. However, the court was correct·that back pay and promotions are not a constitu-
tionally adequate remedy for the serious mental illness and physical pain that Stanley claimed to 
have suffered. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the civilian boards ever were intended 
as a mechanism for redress of the kinds of wrongs Stanley alleged. 
204. 574 F. Supp. at 486 & n.29, 487 & n.32. 
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for the impaired earning capacity of disabled veterans.205 The court 
further opined that the VBA is less effective than a Bivens action be-
cause it might not enable the plaintiff to be made whole and because it 
is less likely to deter future abuses of power by individual officers.206 
It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will accept the 
narrow reading of Chappell and the view of the VBA embraced by the 
Stanley court. Certainly, the disclaimer in Chappell, where the Court 
said that it was not holding military personnel barred from all redress 
in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered during military 
service, was cryptic. How large an opening that remark was intended 
to leave is unclear.207 Whether the Supreme Court ultimately ratifies 
the Stanley courys views or rejects them, the district court performed 
a valuable service in issuing a closely reasoned opinion which reached 
a result the court believed was necessary to "meet the needs of men 
and match their ethical sensibilities. »20s 
b. Retaliatory discharges. Another group of Bivens actions 
brought in the lower federal courts involves adverse actions taken by 
superiors in the employment context, allegedly in retaliation for the 
exercise of first amendment rights. Retaliatory transfers and dis-
charges are the acts typically charged, although retaliatory refusals to 
promote or to rehire also appear. 
In the earliest of these cases one finds some predictable conserva-
tism by judges who had no desire to be the first to expand the availa-
bility of a money damage remedy for constitutional violations beyond 
the fourth amendment context of Bivens. 209 In 1975, in Yiamouyian-
205. 574 F. Supp. at 486 n.29 (quoting S. REP. No. 94-1226, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39, re-
printed in 1916 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 2537, 2565). 
206. 574 F. Supp. at 487-88. Cf. Presson v. Slayden, 570 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Ga. 1983) 
(dismissing for failure to state a claim a pre-Chappell allegation that army defendants contrib-
uted to forced administration of mind-altering drugs to punish and deter plaintiff's 
"whistleblower'' activities); Nagy v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1979) (rejecting 
fifth amendment Bivens claim based upon participation in army LSD experiments without in-
formed consent and upon inadequate follow-up); Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513 
(D.D.C. 1978) (rejecting a fifth amendment Bivens claim based upon army psychiatrists having 
administered drugs against plaintifi's will and without medical justification). 
207. Of the cases the Supreme Court cited in support of its remark, one presented a challenge 
to the validity of Air Force regulations as violative of the first amendment, Brown v. Glines, 444 
U.S. 348 (1980); another was a habeas corpus review ofa court-martial, Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 
733 (1974); and the third involved a servicewoman's petition for declaratory and injunctive relief, 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). None was an action for money damages. 
208. Stanley, 574 F. Supp. at 488 (quoting A. Cox, THE Rou; OF THE SUPREME CoURT IN 
.AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 110 (1976)). 
209. Thus, in Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163 (D. Colo. 1974), the district court 
rejected the efforts of a U.S. Air Force Captain to recover money damages from superior officers 
who he alleged had removed him from a teaching position at the Air Force Academy and reas-
signed him to a base in Nebraska in retaliation for his letter writing to members of Congress. It 
held the Bivens doctrine inapplicable and limited to fourth amendment violations. 384 F. Supp. 
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nis v. Chemical Abstracts Service, 210 the Sixth Circuit became the first 
court of appeals to opine that an employee's claim of retaliatory dis-
charge could, theoretically, give rise to a first amendment claim for 
damages. Plaintiff ultimately lost, however, for inability to establish 
governmental action.211 In 1980, in Hanson v. Hoffmann, 212 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit also approved the cause of action. However, 
the court found it necessary to remand the case to provide plaintiff, 
who had not explicitly relied on a first amendment theory, an opportu-
nity to make out such a claim. 213 
The only extended treatment of the availability of a first amend-
ment Bivens action in the employment context - outside the realms 
where the Civil Service Reform Act214 or Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964215 are applicable- is the en bane decision of the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Egger v. Phillips. 216 Egger was de-
cided just eleven days before the Supreme Court decided Chappell and 
Bush. A former Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), Egger, sued his former supervisor, Phillips, alleging that Phil-
at 165. The military context was not relied upon. In Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285, 
292-93 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
avoided the question of whether a first amendment violation entitled the plaintiff to recover puni-
tive damages by concluding that such damages were inappropriate under the circumstances 
presented. The district court had already avoided the question of whether plaintiff was entitled 
to compensatory damages under Bivens, by holding the defendant liable on other grounds. 
Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191, 204 n.12 (D. Conn. 1974). ·see 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
311 (1976); see also Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 103-04 (2d Cir.) (possibility of a 
first amendment Bivens action left open; professor lost action for retaliatory dismissal for lack of 
sufficient government involvement with defendant), cert denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974); Greenya v. 
George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556, 562-63 n.13 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 995 
(1975) (same question left open). 
210. 521 F.2d 1392, 1393 (6th Cir. 1975). 
211. Yiamouyiannis v. Chemical Abstracts Serv., 578 F.2d 164 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 439 
U.S. 983 (1978). 
212. 628 F.2d 42, 53 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
213. 628 F.2d at 43, 48, 52-53. Plaintiff had cast her action as one for gender discrimination. 
628 F.2d 43. However, part of her claim was that she had been dismissed because of repeated, 
legitimate, inquiries she had made to her superiors about how a maternity leave policy would be 
applied to her and whether it would have discriminatory effects. 648 F.2d at 43, 48-49. In the 
court's view, requests to clarify ambiguous policies might warrant first amendment protection, 
648 F.2d at 51, and the right to explore and discuss constitutional rights springs, in part, from 
the right of free speech. 648 F.2d at 49. Consequently, the dismissal of plaintifi's claim was 
reversed, and plaintiff was given the opportunity to make out a first amendment claim on re-
mand, including the chance to develop the facts to show that her requests to clarify the maternity 
leave policy fell within the protection of the fifth and first amendments. 648 F.2d at 53. The 
District of Columbia District Court had earlier held that an employee discharged in retaliation 
for the exercise of first amendment rights could recover damages under that amendment. Harper 
v. Blumenthal, 478 F. Supp. 176, 180 n.3 (D.D.C. 1979). Harper relied upon Dellums v. Powell, 
566 F.2d 167, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1977); See text at notes 337-41 infra. 
214. 5 u.s.c. §§ 1101-1308 (1976). 
215. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e-2000e16 (1982). 
216. 710 F.2d 292 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 284 (1983). 
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lips recommended plaintifrs transfer from Indianapolis to Chicago 
and took other administrative actions adversely affecting Egger's em-
ployment with the FBI, all in retaliation for plaintiff's efforts to expose 
alleged corruption in the Indianapolis office.217 The district court de-
nied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted, but granted his motion for 
summary judgment.218 A panel of the court of appeals reversed the 
grant of summary judgment as to the first amendment claim.2 19 How-
ever, upon rehearing en bane, the judgment of the district court was 
affirmed. 220 
In arriving at its ultimate conclusion, the court considered first the 
defendant's contention that FBI agents should be precluded from 
bringing damage actions against their superiors for constitutional vio-
lations arising in the scope of their employment, if not absolutely, at 
least with respect to inter-office transfer decisions.221 The court ap-
plied the two-pronged Carlson test222 as to when a Bivens action would 
be defeated. It found neither a special factor counselling hesitation223 
nor any explicit congressional declaration remitting injured persons to 
another remedy.224 In particular, the court held that FBI agents do 
not enjoy such an independent status in our constitutional scheme that 
a judicially created money-damage remedy would be inappropriate.225 
The court also turned aside defendant's argument that FBI agents' 
exemption from civil service protections226 constitutes a special factor 
counselling hesitation.227 The argument apparently was that if Con-
gress has not provided certain protections for federal employees, the 
inference should be drawn that no protection should be given them by 
the courts. The court responded that the absence of a civil service 
217. 710 F.2d at 294. 
218. 710 F.2d at 294-95. 
219. Egger v. Phillips, 669 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 284 (1983). The 
panel affirmed the summary judgment as to plaintiff's other claims. 669 F.2d at 504-05. 
220. 710 F.2d 292. 
221. 710 F.2d at 297, 299. 
222. See text at notes 41-50 supra. 
223. 710 F.2d at 297-300. 
224. 710 F.2d at 297. 
225. 710 F.2d at 297. 
226. Under 28 U.S.C. § 536 (1976), all positions in the FBI are excepted from the competi· 
tive service, and FBI agents occupy positions in the excepted service. One of the consequences of 
this exception is that FBI agents do not enjoy the protections afforded by the Civil Service Re· 
form Act of 1978, or by Civil Service Commission Regulations and Executive Orders to employ-
ees in the competitive service. Many of these protections are described in Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. 
Ct. 2404, 2415-16 (1983). 
227. 710 F.2d at 297. 
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remedy favored recognition of a Bivens claim; not the opposite.228 For 
Egger, as for Bivens, it was damages or nothing.229 
While it may be that to the extent Congress has declared certain employ-
ment practices unlawful which are also unconstitutional and provide 
[sic] federal employees with adequate remedies for such violations, a Biv-
ens action should not be entertained, the constitutional rights of federal 
employees in the workplace which are not protected by statute properly 
form the basis of a Bivens action. The contrary conclusion would rele-
gate federal civil servants to a second class status in relation to their state 
counterparts, and create a double standard between federal and state ac-
tors which the Supreme Court bas condemned.230 
The court also pointed out that the exemption of FBI agents from civil 
service protections was "a far cry" from the explicit congressional dec-
laration necessary to preclude a Bivens action.231 
The court proceeded to reject the contention that Bivens claims 
predicated upon inter-office transfers should be precluded because of 
the importance to the FBI of having flexibility in ascertaining its man-
power needs. 232 Even in personnel matters and even for FBI officials, 
discretion is limited by constitutional constraints, and is thus subject 
to judicial scrutiny.233 Finally, the court torpedoed defendant's argu-
ment that the contractual relationship between the FBI and its agents 
is a special factor counselling hesitation in recognizing a Bivens action. 
FBI agents agree to be transferred anywhere the needs of the service 
demand, but they do not agree to be transferred in violation of their 
constitutional rights, 234 and they do not relinquish their first amend-
ment rights by becoming FBI employees.235 Having concluded that 
Egger could bring a Bivens action, 236 the court went on to determine 
whether Egger's first amendment rights had been violated, and 
228. 710 F.2d at 297. 
229. 710 F.2d at 298. 
230. 710 F.2d at 298 (citations omitted). 5 U.S.C. § 2303 (Supp. II 1978) prohibits FBI 
employees from taking personnel action against other FBI employees as a reprisal for disclosure 
to the Attorney General of information regarding conduct which the employee reasonably be-
lieved evidenced mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, a substantial and 
specific danger to public health or safety or a violation of a law, rule, or regulation. This statute 
did not apply to Egger's situation, however. 
231. 710 F.2d at 298. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does apply to employees of 
the FBI. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982). However, Title VII prchlbits employment discrimination 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. It therefore had no bearing upon 
Egger's claims. 
232. 710 F.2d at 299. 
233. 710 F.2d at 299. 
234. 710 F.2d at 300. 
235. 710 F.2d at 312. 
236. Only four judges concurred in Parts III and V of the en bane decision, the ·parts this 
Article has dwelled upon. The remaining four judges of the court found it unnecessary to resolve 
the issues discussed therein. 710 F.2d at 294 n.*. 
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whether Phillips was protected by a qualified immunity.237 
Egger's thoughtful decision to allow a Bivens action for retaliatory 
transfer in an FBI employment context was consistent with then ex-
isting Supreme Court precedent. While the court criticized238 aspects 
of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Bush v. Lucas, 239 it appears that 
neither the Supreme Court's later affirmance of Bush nor its decision 
in Chappell renders Egger incorrect.240 There are similarities, but 
many differences, between the relationship of an FBI agent to his 
superiors and the relation of a soldier to his commanding officers. 
While judicial decisions have, on occasion, reflected a view that law 
enforcement agencies, somewhat like the military, have a need to 
maintain a high degree of esprit de corps, confidentiality, efficiency, 
discipline and supervision,241 they have declined to find that police 
have the same interest as the military in instant, unquestioning obedi-
ence,242 and have refused to water down the constitutional rights of 
law enforcement officers by analogy to the watered down rights of mil-
itary personnel.243 Even if one assumes arguendo that the FBI has a 
unique disciplinary structure analogous to that of the military, how-
ever, Chappell would not mandate a result different from that reached 
by the Seventh Circuit in Egger. Unlike the situation in Chappell, the 
Constitution does not grant to Congress plenary and exclusive author-
ity over the FBI,244 and Congress has not established a comprehensive 
237. The court found against Egger in both respects. Upon application of a balancing test, 
the court held that his freedom of speech had not been abridged, 710 F.2d at 320-23, and that 
Phillips was protected by the qualified immunity defense because he could not reasonably have 
been expected to know that his actions would violate Egger's right of free speech. 710 F.2d at 
315. 
238. Egger, 710 F.2d at 298 & n.5. 
239. 647 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981). 
240. Some courts have expressed doubt as to the vitality of Egger. See, e.g., Francisco v. 
Schmidt, 575 F. Supp. 1200, 1203 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Langster v. Heckler, No. 80 C 6393 (N.D. 
ID. Aug. 8, 1983). 
241. E.g., Verbeck v. Schnicker, 660 F.2d 1260, 1263 (8th Cir. 1981) (dictum: police and 
military must demand a high level of discipline and duty), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 921 (1982). 
242. E.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 246 (1976) (recognizing a need for discipline, 
esprit de corps, and uniformity in a police force but disavowing reliance upon a historical or 
functional view of the police as "para-military"); Kannisto v. City & County of San Francisco, 
541 F.2d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1976) (stressing the police department's interest in discipline, morale, 
and uniformity but acknowledging that it does not have the identical interest in developing "in-
stant unquestioning obedience" as does the military), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977). 
243. E.g .. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) ("policeman, like teachers and 
lawyers [and unlike military personnel, see Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) and Parker v. 
Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758-61 (1974)], are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutionnl 
rights"); accord Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1193, 1198-99 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 451 
U.S. 925 (1982); Hanneman v. Brier, 528 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1976). 
244. To the contrary, the FBI is part of the executive branch, organized under the Depart-
ment of Justice. In many respects, the Director of the FBI has been authorized to exercise the 
power and authority vested in the Attorney General concerning FBI matters. E.g., 28 C.F.R. 
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internal system of justice to regulate FBI matters. Consequently, 
Chappell 's deference to congressional authority would not preclude 
implication of a Bivens cause of action for FBI agents. 
Similarly, the court's decision in Bush should not cast doubt on 
Egger. Bush found it appropriate to allow Congress to determine the 
scope of a supervisor's liability, in light of the elaborate civil service 
remedial scheme. But there are no special reasons to allow Congress 
to prescribe the scope of relief available to FBI agents whose first 
amendment rights allegedly have been violated by their supervisors. 
Congress has not developed a set of protections and remedies peculiar 
to federal law enforcement personnel, much less a comprehensive and 
meaningful set of such remedies. The exemption of FBI agents from 
civil service protections is, as the Seventh Circuit held, a factor coun-
selling recognition of a Bivens action, not a factor counselling hesita-
tion. 245 There is no basis for inferring from that exemption a 
congressional intention to deny to FBI agents all redress for violations 
of their constitutional rights by their supervisors. Indeed, a denial of 
all redress would be constitutionally impermissible. As four members 
of the Supreme Court commented in another case involving a civil 
servant in the "excepted" service who alleged retaliation for his exer-
cise of first amendment rights, when it comes to protecting civil ser-
vants from arbitrary executive action, "the public interest is 
demonstrably on the side of encouraging less 'vigor' and more 'cau-
tion' on the part of decisionmakers. "246 
Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the Seventh Circuit decided Eg-
ger before the Supreme Court issued its opinions in Bush and Chap-
pell. There is no way to know for certain how differently a Seventh 
Circuit which had read Bush and Chappell would have viewed the sit-
uation presented by Egger. A court prepared to view the FBI as 
paramilitary or to "lump" FBI agents with other federal employees 
whose first amendment rights have been violated by their supervisors 
(as in Bush) might have left justice for FBI agents to Congress or to 
§ .089a (1984) (authorizing the Director to exercise the Attorney General's authority to certify to 
Congress certain claims against the FBI for nonnegligent property damage and also delegating 
limited settlement authority under the FICA); 28 C.F.R. § 0.137 (1984) (authorizing the Direc-
tor to exercise the Attorney General's authority to take final action in matters pertaining to the 
employment, direction, and general administration of personnel in the FBI). It is primarily bod-
ies within the FBI, and its director, who control the internal operations of the Bureau on person-
nel matters, with occasional involvement of the Department of Justice's Office of Professional 
Responsibility. The House Judiciary, Intelligence and Appropriations Committees, and their 
counterparts in the Senate, oversee some aspects of FBI operations, but Congress has not at-
tempted to establish a comprehensive internal system of justice to regulate FBI matters. 
245. Egger, 710 F.2d at 297-98. 
246. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 788 (1982) (White, J., joined by Justices Brennan, 
Marshall and Blackmun, dissenting). 
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the executive branch.247 Absent an intelligent reading of the civil ser-
vice statutes, such as was displayed in Egger, some courts might con-
clude that the civil service statutes were intended to "cover" FBI 
agents, though they afford FBI agents no relief for the kind of injury 
alleged by Egger. Absent proper consideration of the constitutional 
adequacy of such a "remedy," FBI agents could be left without a suit 
for money damages arising directly under the Constitution as well as 
without any other avenue of redress to prevent their constitutional 
rights from becoming a "mere form of words."248 
Additional law on first amendment Bivens actions for retaliatory 
job actions has been generated in cases where the Civil Service Reform 
Act249 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964250 were complicat-
ing factors. The remainder of this subsection of the Article considers 
the effect of Bush and Chappell on Civil Service and Title VII retalia-
247. The recent Supreme Court cases have already begun to spawn such dicta as the 
following: 
The concept of a private right of action has been strictly limited by the • • . Supreme 
Court in the cases of Bush v. Lucas and Chappell v. Wallace. In both Bush and Chappell the 
Court refused to form a private right of action for federal employees and cautioned against 
judicial action in expanding available remedies absent congressional mandate. 
Vakas v. Rodriquez, 728 F.2d 1293, 1296 (10th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). 
248. Another noteworthy aspect of Egger is the court's view that "the fact that this is a First 
Amendment caseis not a factor in the Bivens calculus." 710 F.2d at 299-300 n.7. It is true that a 
court often can apply the tests derived from Bivens, Davis, Carlson, Chappell and Bush without 
regard to which constitutional rights allegedly have been violated. However, none of the cases 
decided by the Supreme Court has disavowed the position taken by Justice Harlan, concurring in 
Bivens, that the courts' capability in making judgments as to causation and the magnitude of 
injury necessary to accord meaningful compensation is also relevant to a court's decision whether 
to create a damage remedy to vindicate a particular constitutional interest. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 
408-09 & 409 n.9 (Harlan, J., concurring). Indeed, the Court has taken to emphasizing Justice 
Harlan's concurrence. See, e.g., Bush, 103 S. Ct. at 2410. If a decision properly can be influ-
enced by those factors, then the specific amendment upon which suit is brought may be relevant 
to the Bivens calculus. While it is true that a decision to create a damage remedy predicated 
upon the factors of causation and magnitude of injury will presage part of the analysis of the 
merits of the constitutional claim, there is nothing extraordinary about such redundancy. (Com-
pare common law courts' consideration of their ability to give a remedy for breach of contract in 
determining whether a contract was formed. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33(1), 
(2) (1981) ("Certainty (1) Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be understood 
as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are 
reasonably certain. (2) The terms. . . are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determin-
ing the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy"). See generally E. FARNS-
WORTH, CoNTRAcrs §§ 3.1, 3.27-3.28 (1982) and, cases there cited (the requirement of 
definiteness, in order for a contract to be formed, is implicit in the principle that contract law 
protects the promisee's expectation interest); U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1978) ("a contract for sale does 
not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably 
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy"). Moreover, there are particularly strong reasons 
for the courts to recognize first amendment Bivens actions, as outlined supra at notes 136-52. 
Some of the arguments in favor of first amendment Bivens actions may not apply, or may apply 
with less force, where other rights are involved. 
249. 5 u.s.c. §§ 1101-1308 (1982). 
250. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e-2000el6 (1982). 
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tory discharge cases.251 
(i) Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) cases. Carroll v. United 
States 252 is one noteworthy decision issued since Bush v. Lucas was 
decided by the Supreme Court. Carroll, a civilian employee at an Air 
Force base, had sought reemployment. Despite high recommenda-
tions for her past performance, she was not hired, although a substan-
tial number of other people were hired. The refusal was allegedly 
based on her past union membership and on her former position as 
union steward. Carroll prevailed before an administrative law judge 
on an unfair labor practice claim that alleged discrimination on the 
basis of union membership, in violation of an executive order,253 but 
on review by the Federal Labor Relations authority, the government 
was ordered merely to give Carroll "first consideration for appropriate 
positions that subsequently became available."254 To obtain fuller re-
lief, she filed a Bivens action. 
The Fifth Circuit initially concluded that the remedy afforded Car-
roll was constitutionally inadequate. Under the applicable executive 
order an applicant for employment was entitled neither to retroactive 
251. Several cases followed the Fifth Circuit's holding in Bush v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 576 
(5th Cir. 1981), affd., 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983), that "the unique relationship between the Federal 
Government and its civil service employees is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in 
inferring a Bivens remedy." E.g., Braun v. United States, 707 F.2d 922, 926 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(denying Bivens remedy to former IRS revenue officer who alleged that IRS officials denied him a 
promotion and took other adverse job actions in retaliation for his criticism and exposure of 
waste, mismanagement and abuse of power, because of the availability of alternative remedies 
and the absence of any affirmative indication by Congress that a Bivens remedy was authorized in 
this situation); Cazalas v. United States Dept. of Justice, 569 F. Supp. 213, 227-29 (E.D. La'. 
1983) (denying Bivens remedy to former assistant U.S. Attorney who alleged termination in retal-
iation for filing a complaint of sex discrimination), ajfd., 731 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3597 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985) (No. 84-56); Gillam v. Roudebush, 547 F. Supp. 
28, 31-32 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (denying Bivens remedy where plaintiff alleged he was removed from 
his VA position in retaliation for filing a grievance); Avitzur v. Davidson, 549 F. Supp. 399, 402-
03 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (denying Bivens remedy where plaintiff alleged retaliatory disability retire-
ment from civilian employment at an Army arsenal). No attempt will be made here to evaluate 
whether anything in the Supreme Court's recent decisions would alter the outcomes in these 
cases, which are already adverse to plaintiffs. 
Several cases involving purported Bivens claims of a nonfirst amendment variety also fol-
lowed the court of appeals opinion in Bush or reasoned similarly. E.g., Broadway v. Block, 694 
F.2d 979, 985 (5th Cir. 1982) (alleged violation of due process rights); Broussard v. United States 
Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 1103, 1112 (5th Cir. 1982) (same); Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349, 357-58 
(8th Cir. 1980) (following Bush in rejecting the Bivens claim based on alleged violation of plain-
tiff's substantive due process rights, but approving an action for damages for the alleged violation 
of procedural due process rights); Fields v. Harris, 522 F. Supp. 901, 905-06 (W.D. Mo. 1981) 
(alleged violation of the second and eighth amendments), affd., 675 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 153 (1982); cf Sonntag v. Dooley, 650 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1981) (in 
accord with Bishop v. Tice in recognizing a Bivens claim for procedural due process violations). 
252. 721 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1983) (Carroll 11), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3511 (1984). 
253. See Carroll v. United States, 707 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1983) (Carroll I). 
254. 707 F.2d at 837. 
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placement nor to back pay.255 Consequently, the remedy given Carroll 
was purely prospective - a fair chance at employment if and when 
other jobs became available. Consistent with the argument made 
herein that redress for a violation of first amendment rights must in-
clude a retrospective compensatory component,256 the Fifth Circuit 
found the inadequacy of the "remedy" to be "obvious,"257 as Carroll 
had been given neither the job she had been illegally denied, nor retro-
active compensation. 
The court distinguished Bush on the ground that the record 
show.ed no indication that the executive order that was violated re-
flected the careful balancing of the employee's rights as a citizen with 
the government's interests as employer that the civil service statutes 
refiect.258 Further, it saw nothing in the relationship between the gov-
ernment and those who apply for government jobs to counsel hesita-
tion. 259 It concluded, "[t]o uphold the district court's ruling [against 
plaintiffj would be the memento mori of Bivens/Carlson in this circuit. 
We decline the invitation to send forth that signal."26o 
This was a good and thoughtful opinion, which made it possible 
for Carroll to obtain a money damage remedy for the violation of her 
. first amendment rights.261 However, the Fifth Circuit reversed itself. 
On rehearing, the court found that it was unable to make "a principled 
distinction between an employee [Bush] and a former employee seek-
ing re-employment . . . sufficient to base a holding that the teachings 
of Bush v. Lucas do not control."262 Thus, it affirmed the district 
court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. 
The court was right the first time around. Carroll's Bivens action 
should not be precluded by the mere fact that some form of adminis-
trative grievance procedure was available to her, whether or not that 
procedure was part of the elaborate, comprehensive scheme for re-
dressing the grievances of civil servants that the Court emphasized in 
Bush. The available grievance procedure did not provide a meaningful 
remedy for Carroll. Indeed, because of its failure to afford any retro-
255. 707 F.2d at 837. 
256. See text at notes 80-81 supra. 
257. Carroll I, 707 F.2d at 839. 
258. 707 F.2d at 839. 
259. 707 F.2d at 839. 
260. 707 F.2d at 839. 
261. It was of limited significance, however, in that the executive order which Carroll alleged 
had been violated was subsequently replaced by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. 707 F.2d 
at 837. Under Bush, someone discriminated against for union activity would not have a Bivens 
claim today, but only the relief made available by Congress. 
262. Carroll II, 721 F.2d at 156. 
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spective relief for the first amendment violation she allegedly had suf-
fered, it was constitutionally inadequate, as the Fifth Circuit originally 
held. Carroll was denied an opportunity to. rectify the violation of her 
first amendment rights because the Bush opinion failed to emphasize 
the need for lower courts to inquire into the adequacy of "exclusive" 
legislative remedies and to guide them in that assessment. 
An equally important court of appeals decision following Bush is 
Pinar v. Dole.263 Pinar, a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) po-
lice officer, sued his superiors for money damages, among other relief, 
alleging that disciplinary actions taken against him violated his first 
amendment rights. 264 Pinar sought to distinguish Bush on the 
grounds that the statutory remedies available to him were inadequate 
and constitutionally deficient. For the actions taken against him (a 
two-day suspension, a letter of reprimand and termination of his tem-
porary promotion), Pinar was limited to filing formal internal agency 
grievances and complaining to the Special Counsel for the Merit Sys-
tem Protection Board (MSPB).265 The Fourth Circuit found that 
Bush remained apposite despite "[t]he fact that the administrative 
remedies available to Pinar were less exhaustive than those available to 
Bush."266 The court further concluded that the remedies available to 
Pinar were both "comprehensive and constitutionally adequate."267 
The court first observed that Pinar did not contend that he had 
been denied access to the protections afforded by statute to one in his 
position.268 It then rejected Pinar's contention that "because he was 
not afforded the exact same statutory remedial procedures available to 
Bush, the statutory procedures afforded him were inadequate as a mat-
ter of due process to redress the alleged violations of his first amend-
ment rights."269 The court reasoned persuasively that less process is 
due for personnel action that is minor than for that which is serious. 
Thus, the mere fact that the extensive administrative remedies af-
forded to Bush upon a demotion were not available to Pinar for a brief 
suspension and letter of reprimand did not render Pinar's statutory 
remedies inadequate per se. 210 
The Fourth Circuit went on to evaluate on their merits the ·proce-
263. 747 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1984). 
264. 747 F.2d at 902. 
265. 747 F.2d at 905. 
266. 747 F.2d at 905. 
267. 747 F.2d at 905. 
268. 747 F.2d at 906. 
269. 747 F.2d at 907. 
270. 747 F.2d at 907-08. 
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dural protections afforded to Pinar. The court detailed the statutory 
procedures available to Pinar, which included a right to file written 
evidence, an opportunity to make a personal presentation to an impar-
tial grievance examiner, a right to be represented by counsel, and a 
right to seek investigation by the MSPB's Special Counsel.271 It 
rightly found the Special Counsel's adverse determination - that 
there was no basis for concluding that the agency had acted illegally in 
disciplining Pinar - not sufficient itself to render his remedy inade-
quate. 272 The court also rebutted Pinar's contention that the Special 
Counsel has absolute discretion to decline to hear a case.273 The court 
did not, however, persuasively answer Pinar's related contention that 
the Special Counsel has absolute discretion to decline to take action in 
cases it does hear. Pinar had no appeal to the MSPB,274 and, according 
to the court, judicial scrutiny was "limited, at most, to insuring com-
pliance with the statutory requirement that the OSC perform an ade-
quate inquiry."275 Nonetheless, the court was satisfied that the 
effectiveness of Pinar's remedy was not undermined by unbridled dis-
cretion resting with the Special Counsel. In light of the strength of the 
first amendment interest Pinar asserted, the rather minor deprivation 
thereof he claimed, the statutory procedures through which he could 
challenge unconstitutional conduct, and the strength of the govern-
ment's interest in maintaining discipline in the workforce,276 the court 
held the CSRA procedures protecting Pinar's first amendment inter-
ests to be constitutionally adequate.277 It thus affirmed the decision to 
deny him a Bivens cause of action.278 
Unfortunately, the Pinar court failed to distinguish the question 
whether the statutory procedures afforded Pinar were "adequate" and 
what was "due" him from the question whether the statutory remedy 
afforded him was constitutionally adequate.279 Those questions are not 
identical; perfectly adequate procedures, fully afforded, might lead 
271. 747 F.2d at 905-06 & n.7. 
272. 747 F.2d at 906. 
273. 747 F.2d at 908. 
274. 747 F.2d at 905. See also Keelfe v. Library of Congress, 588 F. Supp. 778, 791 (D.D.C. 
1984). 
275. Pinar, 747 F.2d at 906 (citing Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
276. The court found that to afford Pinar "a full hearing with the right to direct judicial 
review [of relatively minor personnel actions] would unduly frustrate the government's interest in 
efficiently administering the federal workforce," and would "put supervisors in the untenable 
position of having to take proper supervisory actions against federal employees or take no action 
at all so as to avoid monetary liability." 747 F.2d at 908. 
277. 747 F.2d at 908. 
278. 747 F.2d at 909. 
279. See 747 F.2d at 906-08. 
November 1984] First Amendment Bivens Actions 321 
only to forms of relief that are constitutionally inadequate. The 
court's only reference to the relief available to Pinar was a quotation 
from legislative history, to the effect that a supervisor's taking "action 
against an employee . . . without having proper regard for the indi-
vidual's privacy or constitutional rights . . . could result in dismissal, 
fine, reprimand, or other discipline for the supervisor."280 Since none 
of those "remedies" would compensate Pinar, there is substantial rea-
son to doubt their constitutional adequacy.281 The failure of the Court 
in Bush to elaborate the various aspects of a test for the constitutional 
adequacy of remedial legislation made this kind of incomplete analysis 
likely. 
Still more about the ramifications of Bush can be learned by con-
sidering the effect it would have on a case like Borrell v. United States 
International Communications Agency, 282 decided in 1981. The court 
in Borrell was confronted with a Bivens claim alleging the retaliatory 
discharge of a probationary employee who had complained to fellow 
employees about agency practices that she thought constituted viola-
tions of law and regulations, mismanagement, gross waste of funds 
and abuse of authority. The district court had found, without elabora-
tion, that plaintiff's dismissal was not tainted by constitutional impro-
priety. 283 The District of Columbia Circuit was of the view284 that 
Borrell had a cause of action under the Constitution unless Congress 
had eliminated that right by enacting the Civil Service Reform Act.285 
Relying upon Carlson v. Green and Davis v. Passman, the court rea-
soned that "[ w ]here newly enacted statutory remedies are unavailable 
to a particular segment of employees, the Supreme Court appears to 
have imposed a kind of 'clear statement' requirement on Congress, 
requiring it to indicate explicitly its intent to displace judicially-cre-
ated remedies for constitutional deprivations."286 The CSRA gave 
probationary employees the right to petition for an investigation and 
to seek correction of prohibited personnel practices, but that right 
only. It afforded no right to participate in proceedings before the 
MSPB, and no appeal from adverse personnel actions or from admin-
istrative decisions not to seek correction of an allegedly prohibited per-
280. 747 F.2d at 906 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 
U.S. CooE CoNG. & AD. NEWS at 2745). 
281. See text accompanying note 80-81 supra. 
282. 682 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
283. 682 F.2d at 989. 
284. 682 F.2d at 989. 
285. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 92 Stat. 111 (codified in scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
286. 682 F.2d at 989. 
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sonnel practice.287 Consequently, the court concluded that plaintiff's 
statutory remedies were "not an adequate enough substitute for a prior 
judicial cause of action so that we can infer . . . a Congressional desire 
to eliminate the preexisting right."288 The court found further support 
for this conclusion in legislative history indicating that Congress in-
tended the CSRA to provide "additional, not decreased, protection for 
federal employees who blow the whistle on illegal or improper govern-
ment conduct."289 Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiff could 
assert a Bivens claim.290 It remanded to the district court for findings 
of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to enable the appellate court to 
review the lower court's holding that plaintiff had failed to prove her 
claim.291 
Does this decision survive the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. 
Lucas? It may not. Although the District of Columbia Circuit in-
sisted that Congress clearly state that it intends its remedies to be ex-
clusive, the Supreme Court found it appropriate to defer to the 
congressional scheme redressing federal personnel grievances without 
any clear statement by Congress regarding the intended exclusivity of 
its remediaI scheme. One could distinguish Borrell from Bush by 
stressing the absence of comprehensive and meaningful remedies for 
the probationary employee.292 Such remedies were found to be avail-
able to Bush and were relied upon by the Court. However, my guess is 
that the Court would not accept this distinction. The Court could 
reemphasize the careful attention to conflicting policy considerations, 
the careful balancing of governmental efficiency and employee rights, 
that led Congress to provide lesser remedies and procedural safe-
guards to probationary employees, and could therefore decline to bur-
den managerial personnel with the added risk of personal liability in a 
Bivens action. 293 
287. 682 F.2d at 987-88. 
288. 682 F.2d at 990. 
289. 682 F.2d at 991. 
290. Similar issues have arisen in cases involving purported Bivens claims under other 
amendments. See, e.g., Ray v. Nimmo, 704 F.2d 1480, 1486 & n.15 (11th Cir. 1983) (remanding, 
inter a/ia, for a determination whether a person with a "term appointment" was a federal em-
ployee within the meaning of Bush, claim based on fifth amendment). 
291. Borrell, 682 F.2d 981, 991-92 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
292. The courts of the District of Columbia have adhered to this view. See Williams v. 
Internal Revenue Serv., 745 F.2d 702, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (approving Borrell); 
Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701, 712 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (impliedly approving Borrell, emphasiz-
ing that Borrell's only "statutory remedy was an essentially discretionary and unreviewable peti-
tion"); Keeffe v. Library of Congress, 588 F. Supp. 778, 786-87 (D.D.C. 1984) (approving 
Borrell). 
293. See United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing S. REP. No. 
969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 2723, 
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On the other hand, if the Court were to agree that the weakness of 
the procedural safeguards Congress has afforded to probationary em-
ployees renders their legislated remedies inadequate, it could rely on 
the legislative history invoked by the District of Columbia Circuit to 
conclude that the CSRA remedy was not intended to be exclusive and 
preclusive of a Bivens claim. Alternatively, as noted in Part I, mean-
ingful access to legislated remedies can be viewed as an element of the 
constitutional adequacy of those remedies.294 The CSRA's failure to 
afford probationary employees the right to participate in proceedings 
before the MSPB or the right to appeal from adverse personnel actions 
could amount to a failure to afford meaningful access to legislated 
remedies. If it does, courts should follow Borrell to allow Bivens ac-
tions, on the basis of the inadequacy of the congressional scheme. 
The concern that Borrell does not survive Bush is reinforced by a 
number of recent decisions, in particular by a district court's recent 
reversal of itself in a case which had been consistent with Borrell. In 
Francisco v. Schmidt 295 the court had denied defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on a Bivens claim brought by a probationary em-
ployee who alleged a retaliatory discharge. Relying upon plaintiff's 
inability to appeal to the MSPB and upon the absence of any statutory 
provisjon for money damages, the court had held that the remedies 
provided by Congress were of no use to the plaintiff. No special fac-
tors counselling hesitation had been advanced by the defendants. 296 
Despite the court's finding that, as in Bivens and Davis, it was damages 
or nothing for the plaintiff,297 it concluded on rehearing that "the ra-
tionale of Bush extends to actions by probationary federal employees 
who are excluded from the statutory remedial scheme."298 The court 
reasoned that the federal employer-employee relationship was a spe-
cial factor that counselled hesitation, notwithstanding Congress' deci-
sion to exclude probationary employees from its remedial scheme. 
The Supreme Court had determined that Congress is in a superior po-
sition to balance the competing policy considerations, and Congress' 
decision to exclude probationary employees reflects an assessment of 
those considerations. The court was also concerned that creation of a 
Bivens remedy for probationary employees would be anomalous and 
2767) (CSRA deliberately precludes judicial review of adverse decisions as to probationary em-
ployees), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1414 (1984). 
294. See text at note 82 supra. 
295. 532 F. Supp. 850 (E.D. Wis. 1982). 
296. 532 F. Supp. at 853-54. 
297. Francisco v. Schmidt, 575 F. Supp. 1200, 1202 (E.D. Wis. 1983). 
298. 575 F. Supp. at 1202. 
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contrary to congressional intent in that it would afford them a means 
of redress potentially more effective than the means available to non-
probationary employees. 299 
This latest decision is certainly understandable. The problem is 
that it leaves Francisco with a completely unredressed violation of his 
first amendment rights. For Francisco, the first amendment has been 
rendered a mere form of words. When Congress enacts an "exclusive" 
remedial scheme, the courts must verify that it is constitutionally ade-
quate, not just in general, but for the particular plaintiff.300 The statu-
tory remedy was not constitutionally adequate for Francisco if, as the 
court found, it denied him all relief. Like Ms. Carroll, and Mr. Pinar, 
Mr. Francisco is suffering the unredressed violation of his first amend-
ment rights because the Supreme Court in Bush failed to emphasize 
that courts must assess the constitutional adequacy of congressional 
remedial schemes and afford a Bivens remedy when the congressional 
scheme is judged to be constitutionally inadequate. 
The Francisco court is very probably right that Congress did not 
intend probationary employees to have more effective means of redress 
available to them than regular civil service employees enjoy. How-
ever, it would appear that the only escape from this anomaly is for 
Congress to enact constitutionally adequate remedies for probationary 
employees. 301 Until that occurs, the Constitution requires that proba-
tionary employees be afforded a remedy that will compensate them for 
the violation of their constitutional rights. If that flies in the face of 
congressional intent, so be it. The Constitution requires no less. 
The rush to follow Bush in denying Bivens actions is evidenced in 
other cases as well. Relying on Bush, in Gleason v. Malcom 302 the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected a first amendment 
Bivens action on the ground that plaintiff could have sought reinstate-
ment and back pay pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act 
299. 575 F. Supp. at 1202-03. See also Crumpler v. Etter, 579 F. Supp. 391, 392 (E.D.N.C. 
1983) (denying a first amendment Bivens action to a temporary limited employee whose adminis-
trative remedies for wrongful discharge were discretionary and "considerably more limited" than 
those available to Bush). 
300. See text at notes 78-79 supra. 
301. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), had a similarly ironic result. 
[Davis] grants federal employees in non-competitive positions, whom Congress did not in-
tend to protect, a more direct and forceful remedy than Congress provided for employees in 
the competitive service whom Congress did intend to protect, since the latter are bound by 
the ruling that Title VII is the "exclusive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme 
for the redress of federal employment discrimination. . • ." 
P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE FED-
ERAL SYSTEM 190 (2d ed. Supp. 1981) (citation omitted). 
302. 718 F.2d 1044 (11th Cir. 1983). 
November 1984] First Amendment Bivens Actions 325 
(APA).3°3 While characterizing that alternative as "adequate,"304 the 
court never discussed whether the AP A was intended to furnish exclu-
sive remedies or whether it even applied to all the first amendment 
violations plaintiff alleged. The gaps in the court's reasoning are not 
excused by the frivolous nature of plaintiff's complaints. 305 In Lang-
ster v. Heckler, 306 a district court denied a Bivens claim of retaliation 
because of plaintiff's union activities, when plaintiff could have pur-
sued administrative remedies under an executive order. Emphasizing 
that the executive order was part of the "elaborate, comprehensive 
scheme" relied upon in Bush, the court denied relief without giving 
any serious attention to plaintiff's argument that the available remedy 
was not meaningful because it would neither be rendered by an impar-
tial body nor subject to meaningful judicial review.307 
(ii) Title VII cases. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination 
on the basis of race, color, sex, religion or national origin. 308 It also 
expressly prohibits employers from taking adverse action against em-
303. 5 u.s.c. §§ 701-706 (1982). 
304. Gleason, 718 F.2d at 1048. 
305. Plaintiff alleged, for example, "that supervisors and other employees violated her first, 
fourth and fifth amendment rights by listening to her telephone conversations in an open office, 
and by making notes of the times she entered and left the office." 718 F.2d at 1046. She had 
earlier charged that her first amendment rights were violated when "the generals asked her not to 
call after hours and not to come to their homes .... " 718 F.2d at 1045. It is not entirely clear 
from the opinion which "constitutional injuries" remained part of her Bivens claim. 718 F.2d at 
1046 & n.3. 
306. No. 80 C 6393, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 1983). 
307. See also Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701, 711-12 & n.6. (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bush precludes 
federal management analyst from asserting first amendment Bivens action alleging refusal to pro-
mote, even if his persistent criticisms of the agency employing him were in the public interest); 
Hallock v. Moses, 731 F.2d 754 (11th Cir. 1984) (Bush precludes Bivens claim alleging harass-
ment and retaliation for filing an employee grievance); Vest v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 
729 F.2d 1284 (10th Cir. 1984) (Bush precludes Bivens claim for retaliatory discharge); Gamma! 
v. Hamrock, 725 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1983) (!Jush bars Bivens action by former federal employee), 
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2657 (1984) (see 52 U.S.L.W. 3766, (Apr. 17, 1984) (No. 83-1420)); 
Mason v. Pierce, No. 83 C 3427, slip op. (N.D. Ill. July 3, 1984) (Bush bars federal employee's 
Bivens action alleging discharge in retaliation for protest against race, sex, and age discrimina-
tion); Wilson v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 202, 208 & n.7 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (Bush bars Bivens 
action for retaliatory action by supervisor, even though plaintiff might be time barred from pur-
suing administrative remedies); Metz v. McKinley, 583 F. Supp. 683, 689-90 (S.D. Ga. 1984) 
(Bush bars Bivens action alleging retaliatory discharge); Watson v. United States Dept. of Hous. 
& Urban Dev., 576 F. Supp. 580, 585-86 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (rejecting a Bivens claim based on a 
retaliatory transfer though plaintiff did not have available the same administrative safeguards 
available to Bush); Walsh v. United States, No. 81-CV-712, slip op. (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1983) 
(Bush precludes first amendment Bivens action by taxpayer service representative alleging retalia-
tory failure to promote). But cf. Keeffe v. Library of Congress, 588 F. Supp. 778, 791 (D.D.C. 
1984) (leaving open the question whether an employee who never had access to the appeals 
process culminating in the MSPB could assert a Bivens action); Nietert v. Kelley, 582 F. Supp. 
1536, 1537 (D. Colo. 1984) (Bush does not preclude Bivens action arising out of allegedly im-
proper exclusion from the grounds of the Air Force Academy because relevant regulations do 
not afford judicial review of the alleged constitutional violations). 
308. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-16 (1982). 
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ployees for opposing an unlawful employment practice,309 and it has 
been construed to protect advocacy in the employment context.310 
The argument has been made that Title VII precludes Bivens actions 
in cases where claims for money damages were predicated upon al-
leged violations of the first amendment guarantee of free speech. In 
some of these Bivens cases the courts believed that the 1976 Supreme 
Court opinion in Brown v. General Services Administration311 required 
them to hold Title VII to be aggrieved employees' exclusive remedy. 
The cases so holding typically assumed, without analysis, that the Ti-
tle VII remedies were constitutionally adequate as well. Indeed, they 
usually showed no sign of recognizing that constitutional adequacy of 
the remedy was even a relevant question. As repeatedly observed in 
this Article, the courts are obliged to determine for themselves 
whether legislated remedies meet the minimum required by the Con-
stitution to make its guarantees meaningful.312 
In contrast to the cases which have read Title VII, alone or in 
conjunction with Brown, to be an exclusive remedy, other cases have 
viewed Title VII as not intended to preclude first amendment Bivens 
claims. In Neely v. Blumenthal 313 Judge Sirica of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia analyzed Brown as decided on the 
basis of sovereign immunity,314 a doctrine which curtails the ability of 
309. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-3 (1982). 
310. E.g., Berg v. LaCrosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1980) (protects statements to 
the employer pointing out or protesting discriminatory conduct); EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, 
Inc., 401 F. Supp. 66, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (protects "advising fellow employees of their rights 
under the law"), ajfd., 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977); Tipler v. E.I. 
duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971) (protects running for union office to 
oppose employer's unlawful discrimination). See generally c. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. 
RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 2.10 at 192 
(1980) ("The most obvious reason for separately protecting 'opposition' and participation in 
EEOC processes is simply to guard against retaliation for vocal protests, even those which might 
appear to some employers to be 'disloyal' or to have a coercive aspect." (footnotes omitted)). 
311. 425 U.S. 820 (1976). In Brown. an action against a federal agency and not individuals, 
the Court held that § 717 of Title VII provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of dis-
crimination in federal employment. It based its decision on legislative intent, and on the "bal-
ance, completeness, and structural integrity" of the section. 425 U.S. at 832.· The result in that 
case was that plaintiff's complaint against the GSA was time-barred, for he had failed to file 
within 30 days of final agency action as required by§ 717(c). Some courts have read Brown to 
require the rejection of Bivens actions against federal officials and employees sued as individuals. 
E.g., Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 542-43 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Title VII precludes a Bivens 
action based on alleged employment discrimination), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 709 (1984); White v. 
GSA, 652 F.2d 913, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1981) (Title VII precludes a Bivens action based on racial 
discrimination and on retaliation for filing an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
charge); Porter v. Adams, 639 F.2d 273, 278 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); Gissen v. Tackman, 537 
F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1976) (same as Kizas). 
312. See text at notes 69-73 supra. 
313. 458 F. Supp. 945 (D.D.C. 1978). 
314. 458 F. Supp. at 952-54. In determining congressional intent in Brown, the Supreme 
Court discussed the strong influence of Congress' doubt that backpay or other compensatory 
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claimants to obtain relief against the federal government but speaks 
not at all to damage actions against officials in their individual capaci-
ties. The court opined that "[o]nly when the waivers [of sovereign 
immunity] reflect an explicit intent to extinguish parallel remedies is 
the potential for individual liability diminished. . . . [N]othing in Ti-
tle VII reveals an intent to disturb avenues of relief against discrimi-
nating officials in their personal capacities .... "31s 
Despite the freedom of action the D.C. court perceived itself to 
have, it refused to recognize a Bivens claim for Neely, who challenged 
disciplinary actions taken against hiin as stemming from his active, 
vocal opposition to employment practices that, in his view, dispropor-
tionately affected black workers.316 The court relied on several fac-
tors: that plaintiff was not relegated to pursuing claims based on 
hostile state law theories; that Title VII was a more than adequate 
vehicle for vindicating his first amendment interests, particularly as he 
had claimed only economic-injuries which could be fully redressed by 
the injunctive, reinstatement and back pay remedies authorized by Ti-
tle VII; that plaintiff had no right to insist that his recovery come from 
his superiors rather than out of government funds;317 that recognition 
of a Bivens action would allow claimants to bypass the administrative 
procedures that are a prerequisite to suing the government;318 and 
that, in its view, the wrongs asserted did not involve core constitu-
tional violations.319 
relief for employment discrimination were available to remedy unconstitutional agency action. 
One of the sources of doubt relied upon by the Court was Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271 
(8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970), a case turning on sovereign immunity. The 
Court also relied upon legislative history concerned with the inability to sue the federal govern-
ment. Brown, 425 U.S. at 826-29. 
315. Neely, 458 F. Supp. at 954-55 (D.D.C. 1978). In Brown. the Supreme Court had found 
that the congressional intent was not to allow a federal government employee to pursue his rights 
under both Title VII and under other applicable state and federal statutes. 425 U.S. at 833-34. 
The Neely court apparently did not understand this to rebut its argument that constitutionally 
based claims against federal officials sued in their individual capacities survived Brown. It is also 
noteworthy that, in contrast to Brown. the Supreme Court has held that "[d]espite Title VII's 
range and its design as a comprehensive solution for the problem of invidious discrimination in 
employment" an individual employed in the private sector may supplement his Title VII action 
with an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, to recover damages which are not available under Title 
VII. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975). 
316. Neely, 458 F. Supp. at 960 (D.D.C. 1978). 
317. 458 F. Supp. at 956-57. 
318. 458 F. Supp. at 952. The Neely court also noted that if claimants were permitted to join 
Title VII and constitutional tort claims in a single action some inconvenience would result: either 
Title VII suits would be converted into jury matters and constitutional tort suits expedited (I» 
cause of the requirement that Title VII actions be tried within 120 days), or the proceedings 
would be bifurcated with a concomitant waste of judicial resources. 458 F. Supp. at 952 n.10 
(D.D.C. 1978). 
319. 458 F. Supp. at 960. The Neely court, in dicta, distinguished other situations when a 
Bivens claim could properly be implied. It hypothesized a situation in which a plaintift's first 
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A similar decision was rendered in Langster v. Schweiker. 320 A 
man who had not been selected for an executive position with the So-
cial Security Administration sued, alleging that a negative evaluation 
of him was a retaliatory result of his union activities, in violation of 
both Title VII and the first amendment.321 Following Neely, the court 
held that Brown did not bar Langster from proceeding against federal 
officials in their individual capacities, even insofar as the first amend-
ment claims against those defendants simultaneously stated claims 
fully remediable by Title VII. 322 Insofar as the first amendment claims 
charged retaliation stemming from personal dislike of plaintiff because 
of his advocacy as a union representative, Title VII provided no rem-
edy, for it does not proscribe such conduct, and it was all the more 
clearly not preemptive. 323 Having found that Title VII did not pre-
clude plaintiff's Bivens action, the court nonetheless concluded that 
such an action ought not be implied for plaintiff's claims that were also 
remediable by Title VII. It relied heavily upon the court of appeals 
decision in Bush v. Lucas, 324 in concluding that the federal employ-
ment relationship counseled hesitation "particularly when a plaintiff 
has both a developed administrative remedy and, thereafter, a devel-
oped judicial remedy independent of the administrative process, both 
of which are capable of providing him most, if not all, of the relief he 
seeks."325 
amendment claims were unrelated to his Title VII claims (as where an employee had been penal· 
ized because of his race and because of his advocacy on subjects unrelated to minority rights), 
and another in which predominantly personal, noneconomic injuries were alleged, so that Title 
VII's remedies were likely to be ineffective. 458 F. Supp. at 960. Other courts have upheld 
Bivens actions on similar bases. E.g., Ray v. Nimmo, 704 F.2d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(upholding Bivens claim for violation of procedural due process rights as not within Title VII's 
ambit of exclusivity for claims of sex discrimination though the two claims arose from the same 
failure to promote plaintifi). But see Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 815 (9th Cir. 1982) (contra 
to Ray). 
320. 565 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
321. 565 F. Supp. at 410. Langster made other allegations which are not pertinent here. 
322. 565 F. Supp. at 414-16. 
323. 565 F. Supp. at 413. In reaching this latter conclusion, the court relied upon the fact 
that to hold otherwise would force plaintiff to choose between two theories - that defendant 
Caruthers' conduct arose from her animus towards plaintiff's union activities (proscribed by Title 
VII) or that her conduct derived from personal dislike of plaintiff's protection of contract rights 
(not proscribed by Title VII) - thus increasing the risk of being denied all relief. It held that 
neither Title VII nor Brown mandated that result. 565 F. Supp. at 414. See also Brosnahan v. 
Eckerd, 435 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D.D.C. 1977) (upholding Bivens claim, brought together with Title 
VII claims). 
324. 647 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), ajfd., 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983). 
325. Langster v. Schweiker, 565 F. Supp. at 419. It appears that the court allowed the Bivens 
action insofar as plaintiff alleged retaliation stemming from personal dislike, because of his advo-
cacy as a union representative, which was not within Title VII. 565 F. Supp. at 413-14. Another 
case of the same ilk is MacAnaw v. Custis, 29 Empt. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 32,778 (D. Kan. 1982). 
The MacAnaw court rejected the contention that Title VII barred plaintiff physician's first 
amendment claim of retaliation for remarks she had made concerning her employer, the VA, 
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Whether Title VII should be read to preclude a money damage 
remedy for federal employees against government officials sued in 
their individual capacities is beyond the scope of this Article. One can 
infer from Davis v. Passman, 326 however, that the Court would read 
Brown to foreclose Bivens actions to federal employees covered by Ti-
tle VII who seek to redress the violation of rights guaranteed by the 
statute, but would not read Brown to foreclose Bivens actions to those 
federal employees not covered by the statute nor to those seeking to 
redress violations beyond its scope. If that is so, the Court would dis-
approve some of the reasoning in Neely and Langster, but it would 
likely approve their results, as the Court would view Title VII as a bar 
to both Neely's claim and to the claim on which Langster lost. Once 
again, however, it should be said that a conclusion that Title VII was 
intended to be the exclusive remedy for "covered" federal employees 
seeking to redress rights guaranteed by the statute ought not to be the 
last step in analysis. The courts should go on to the question of the 
adequacy under the Constitution of the remedy afforded to covered 
employees by Title VII. 321 
On the other hand, if the Neely andLangster courts were correct in 
determining that Title VII was not meant to exclude employee law-
suits against individuals, so that Title VII did not preclude the Bivens 
actions plaintiffs had pleaded, their results are more questionable. 
Both courts denied relief. Having concluded, in the language of Neely, 
that "nothing in Title VII reveals an intent to disturb avenues of relief 
against discriminating officials in their personal capacities ... " 328 
their outcomes cannot rest on the existence of an alternative remedy 
which Congress intended to substitute for recovery directly under the 
Constitution. They must rest on special factors counselling hesitation. 
Langster relies, in this regard, upon the federal employment relation-
where she had also filed an administrative complaint charging sex discrimination, and the two 
claims arose from related events. 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 25,605. The court concluded 
that a constitutional tort had been alleged and that no equally effective remedy had been demon-
strated for redressing the past violations, although statutory disciplinary proceedings had made 
unnecessary an injunction against forced transfer of the plaintiff. It further concluded that no 
special factors counseled hesitation where the administrative machinery for resolving problems 
arising from the employer-employee relationship was not adapted to the first amendment claims 
plaintiff was pursuing. Consequently, the court found that plaintiff had successfully alleged a 
Bfrens action. 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 25,605-07. 
326. 442 U.S. 228, 247 n.26 (1979). The Court in Davis stated that the remedies provided by 
§ 717 of Title VII are exclusive when those federal employees covered by the statute seek to 
redress violations of rights guaranteed by the statute. The Court went on to hold that plaintiff, a 
federal employee not covered by Title VII, could sue directly under the Constitution to redress a 
violation of her fifth amendment rights. See text at notes 24-38 supra. 
327. See text at note 77 supra. 
328. Neely, 458 F. Supp. at 954-55. 
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ship together with the administrative and judicial remedies available to 
the plaintiff. This merging of the two distinct tests laid down in Carl-
son329 for determining when the courts should decline to imply a Biv-
ens remedy is essentially the approach taken by the Court shortly after 
Langster, in Chappell and Bush. The criticisms of this approach made 
above would also be pertinent here. 330 To the extent that Neely is sim-
ilarly grounded, it is subject to the same criticism. 
Insofar as Neely rested on the "adequacy" of Title VII to vindicate 
plaintiff's first amendment interests, without regard to the employment 
relationship, and in the face of a finding that Congress did not intend 
Title VII to preclude actions against discriminating officials, the deci-
sion went beyond anything the Supreme Court has done. · The Court 
never has held that a merely "adequate" congressional remedy pre-
cludes a Bivens action. Rather, the Court stated in Bivens, Carlson and 
Bush that legislative remedies will defeat a Bivens action only when 
Congress considers its remedial schemes to be as effective as a Bivens 
remedy, and indicates that its remedial scheme is intended to be a sub-
stitute for recovery directly under the Constitution. Insofar as Neely 
rested on the "adequacy" of Title VII remedies available to the plain-
tiff, without regard to the federal employment relationship as a "spe-
cial factor" a la Bush, it was thus unsupported by precedent. 
Several other aspects of the court's reasoning warrant discussion. 
First, theNeely court's view that plaintiff had no right to insist that his 
recovery come from his superiors rather than from government funds 
seems to beg the question. If none of the circumstances that the Court 
has held should defeat a Bivens action were present, plaintiff did have 
a right to assert his claim against his superiors. Also, if, as the court 
held, Title VII was not intended to preclude a suit against an official in 
his individual capacity, the court's concern that a Bivens suit will en-
able a federal employee to bypass administrative procedures that are a 
prerequisite to suing the government seems groundless. Finally, the 
court's reliance on the judgment that the wrongs asserted were not 
core constitutional violations is troubling. While it is true that the first 
amendment rights of public employees are circumscribed by the neces-
sities of maintaining orderly and efficient public administration,331 
Neely alleged a violation of those first amendment rights that he re-
tained. The speech which Neely alleged had caused his termination 
was vocal opposition to employment practices that disproportionately 
disadvantaged black workers. Such speech does not appear to be re-
329. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
330. See text at note 106 & text following note 130 supra. 
331. Neely, 458 F. Supp. at 960. 
November 1984] First Amendment Bivens Actions 331 
mote from the core of the first amendment. Furthermore, it seems a 
dangerous precedent for courts to make judgments about the relative 
value of speech addressed to social or political issues. Unless the fed-
eral employment relation properly constituted a special factor counsel-
ling hesitation, the Neely court ought to have afforded Neely a Bivens 
remedy, given its conclusion that Title VII was not intended to disturb 
other avenues of relief against discriminating officials in their individ-
ual capacities. 
2. When Congress Has Been Silent 
In the final category of first amendment Bivens cases, the plaintiffs' 
claims did not arise out of either military service or federal employ-
ment. Instead, the claims arose out of government conduct that was 
not the subject of any remedial federal legislation. As shown below, 
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Bush and Chappell should have little 
impact in these cases, because both Bush and Chappell involved claims 
that could be at least partly redressed through elaborate statutory re-
medial schemes. Lower federal courts should therefore not infer from 
the Court's denial of a first amendment Bivens action to Bush that no 
first amendment Bivens action should be afforded to anyone, under 
any circumstances. To the contrary, as reaffirmed in Bush, the federal 
courts have power to award damages to the victim of a constitutional 
violation. In the absence of an adequate remedy afforded by Congress, 
"the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that 
is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed, 
however, to any special factors counselling hesitation .... "332 Many 
lower courts faced with that determination have concluded that plain-
tiffs may seek vindication of their first amendment rights through a 
Bivens action. 
One group of such Bivens cases has been born of action taken by 
federal officials that interfered with demonstrators so as to allegedly 
violate their first amendment rights of speech and association or their 
right to petition the government for redress of grievances. At first, 
some judges avoided deciding whether demonstrators should be af-
forded a money damage remedy against federal officials. 333 Others be-
lieved it clear, however, that Bivens authorized a cause of action for 
damages for violation of interests guaranteed by the first amend-
ment. 334 Butler v. United States335 is an early case providing a Bivens 
332. Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2411 (1983). 
333. E.g., Green v. Laird, 357 F. Supp. 227, 230 & n.5 (N.D. ID. 1973). 
334. E.g., Gardels v. Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 1389, 1392, 1398 (N.D. ID. 1974) (upholding 
Bivens action against agent of President Nixon's Advance Office alleged to have assaulted demon-
332 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:269 
action for would-be demonstrators. In Butler, the court held that 
members of the public who had been prevented from peacefully dem-
onstrating against then President Nixon's Vietnam War policies at an 
air force base to which the public had been invited, had a claim for 
money damages for violation of their first amendment rights.336 Addi-
tional support for a Bivens action to vindicate first amendment rights 
allegedly violated in the context of demonstrations is provided by Del-
lums v. Powell, 337 decided by the Court of Appeals for the Bistrict of 
Columbia Circuit in 1977. The pertinent allegations were that various 
officials of the United States and of the District of Columbia had con-
spired to arrest and detain approximately 2,000 persons who were law-
fully protesting the war in Vietnam by making and listening to 
speeches at the Capitol. Defendants were said to have acted with the 
purpose of frustrating plaintiffs' first amendment right to protest the 
war. 338 The court did not expressly inquire into the existence of spe-
cial factors counselling hesitation or of preemptive action by Congress, 
presumably because there were no colorable arguments to be ad-
dressed. Rather, the focus was the concern of Justice Harlan's concur-
rence in Bivens that courts might not be able to make the necessary 
judgments concerning causation and the magnitude of injury to accord 
meaningful compensation for invasion of particular constitutional 
rights. 339 The court found neither the causation nor magnitude of in-
jury judgments to be particularly troublesome. The court reasoned 
that the violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights was "directly at-
strators, ripped signs and banners from them, and intimidated, disrupted and prevented them 
from expressing their views, while demonstrators supporting the President were left undis-
turbed); Sparrow v. Goodman, 361 F. Supp. 566 (W.D.N.C. 1973), ajfd. sub nom. Rowley v. 
McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1974) (upholding Bivens action against Secret Service agents 
who had denied admission to a public gathering attended by the President to persons who op-
posed the war in Vietnam, were critical of the President or his administration's policies, or who 
otherwise expressed dissent from reigning points of view). 
335. 365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Hawaii 1973). 
336. In finding it appropriate to provide plaintiffs with a money damage remedy directly 
under the Constitution to redress violations of their first amendment rights, the court relied on 
much of the reasoning outlined in the text at notes 136-52 supra. Briefly, the court reasoned that 
first amendment rights are no less important than the fourth amendment rights at stake in Biv· 
ens; that it would be "anomalous to conclude that the federal judiciary • • • is powerless to 
accord a damages remedy to vindicate social policies which, by virtue of their inclusion in the 
Constitution, are aimed predominantly at restraining the Government as an instrument of popu-
lar will," 365 F. Supp. at 1041 (quoting Justice Harlan's concurrence in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 403· 
04); that a private damage action is the only practicable means of redressing the wrong alleged 
once the time for exercising first amendment rights has passed; and, finally, that federal officials 
should be held as accountable for their actions as those acting under color of state law are held 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
337. 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). 
338. 566 F.2d at 173-74. 
339. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 409 
& n.9 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
November 1984] First Amendment Bivens Actions 333 
tributable to the arresting officers"340 and that awarding damages to 
redress intangible first amendment injuries would be as judicially ad-
ministrable as awarding damages to redress intangible fourth amend-
ment injuries. 341 
The most important factors contributing to the success enjoyed by 
the plaintiffs in Butler and Dellums are the absence of comprehensive 
legislation regulating demonstrations and providing remedies for the 
infringement of first amendment rights so as to preclude Bivens claims, 
and the absence of any of the special factors counselling hesitation that 
the Court has identified. The defendants were officials who do not 
enjoy such a special status in our constitutional scheme as to make 
judicial remedies against them inappropriate, and this is not an area in 
which Congress has any special role, as in Chappell, or special exper-
tise, as in Bush. Thus, as previously noted, the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Bush and Chappell should not affect cases like Butler or 
Dellums. 
The plaintiffs' success in these cases also springs from the fact that 
the speech involved was political speech, at the very core of the first 
amendment. 342 Further, the defendant government officials were al-
leged to have prevented or suppressed the plaintiffs' speech, not 
"merely" to have punished plaintiffs for their speech, after the fact. 
The Supreme Court has long viewed prior restraints as a more drastic 
340. Dellums, 566 F.2d at 194-95. The court also commented upon the familiarity of the 
courts with first amendment issues from cases in which equitable relief is sought, and upon the 
proven ability of the courts to deal with problems of causation and to prescribe the elements of 
the cause of action and defenses thereto in first amendment cases. 
341. 566 F.2d at 195·96. The injury to plaintiffs was the loss of an opportunity to express 
their dissatisfactions with the laws and policies of the United States in a manner that would cause 
their views to be brought to the attention of a national audience and Congress, and in a manner 
that would express the passion with which plaintiffs held their views. The court held this intangi-
ble injury to be significant and to be sufficiently quantifiable that a properly instructed jury could 
award monetary recompense. But cf. Saffron v. Wilson, 481 F. Supp. 228, 246 (D.D.C. 1979), 
holding that the heads of the U.S. Park Police, of the U.S. Secret Service, and of the D.C. Metro-
politan Police Department had violated plaintiff's constitutional right to engage in expressive 
conduct on the White House sidewalk on Inaugural Day 1973. Among the court's reasons for 
rejecting a damages remedy were the lack of physical mistreatment or real economic loss, leading 
to absence of a recognized means of quantifying the harm done, and the availability of other 
forms of relief. 481 F. Supp. at 246. 
Even in the view of the Saffron court, the difficulty of measuring plaintiff's damages was not 
an insurmountable barrier to a monetary remedy. However, because plaintiff was a perennial 
demonstrator, the court regarded declaratory and equitable' relief as more efficacious than money 
damages, even (somehow) as to the past violations of his first amendment rights. In this aspect of 
its reasoning the court erred. Even if the deprivation of Saffron's right to speak was not in the 
nature of speech postponed being speech denied, he did suffer a violation of his first amendment 
rights for which exclusively future-oriented relief afforded him no remedy. 
342. Political speech and political association are deserving of greater protection than, for 
example, commercial speech and commercial association. See Central Hudson Gas v. Public 
Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 & n.5 (1980); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10-11 n.9 
(1979); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976). 
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infringement upon free speech than subsequent punishment.343 The 
same concerns that render prior restraints presumptively invalid un-
doubtedly led to the courts' relative solicitude for political demonstra-
tors who have been thwarted by law enforcement officials purporting 
to act under the aegis of "time, place and manner" regulations. Fur-
thermore, courts recognize that political speech is topical, and that 
delay is therefore far less tolerable than when imposed upon nontopi-
cal speech. Consequently, thwarted demonstrators who establish that 
federal action prevented the expression of their views in violation of 
the first amendment are very attractive candidates for judicial relief. 
Since the courts have no power to recapture the lost moment for plain-
tiffs whose speech was interrupted, only money damages344 compen-
sate for the injuries they suffered. 34s 
Another group of cases arising from government conduct that is 
not the subject of remedial federal legislation involves allegations that 
first amendment rights were violated when federal agencies having in-
vestigative powers abused their authority. Agents of the FBI, Internal 
Revenue Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Federal 
Election Commission and Federal Trade Commission are among those 
343. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); see also New York Times v. United States, 
403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Bantam 
Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). One of the primary concerns underlying the heavy pre-
sumption against prior restraints is that a prior restraint allows the government to destroy the 
immediacy of the intended speech. Speech delayed may be speech effectively denied. See Carroll 
v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968); Wood v. Georgia, 370_U.S. 375, 392 (1962); Pcnnc-
kamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 346-47 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268·69 (1941); 
Walker v. City ofBirmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 336 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). When speech 
is delayed, individual fulfillment suffers and error born of ignorance goes uncorrected. Forbid-
ding prior restraints also ensures that speech can be placed before the public, albeit under the 
threat of possible subsequent punishment. Another concern is that "any system of censorship 
insufficiently constrained by the safeguards of the judicial process is apt to overreach; censors 
uncontrolled by courts tend to deny publication to material protected by the first amendment." 
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 726 (1978). Courts have acted on these concerns 
by striking down overbroad prohibitions and permit requirements for public demonstrations, 
e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Shuttlesworth v. City ofBirmingham, 394 U.S. 
147 (1969); Kunz v. United States, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 
(1938); Fernandez v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1124 (1982); Del-
lums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 178-81 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978), and 
by permitting criminal defendants to raise the facial invalidity of regulations as a defense. E.g., 
Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1968); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 44, 452-53 
(1938). 
344. Declaratory or injunctive relief may also be appropriate, to assure that violations of 
plaintiff's first amendment rights will not recur, but, as noted earlier, see text at note 81 supra, 
these forward looking forms of relief are not a constitutionally adequate remedy for past 
violations. 
345. See also Logiurato v. ACTION, 490 F.Supp 84, 93 (D.D.C. 1980), where the court 
sustained a first amendment Bivens claim against a Peace Corps medical officer and the director 
of a private corporation that trained Peace corps volunteers. Defendants were alleged to have 
drugged,. repatriated and hospitalized plaintiff against his will to preclude him from criticizing 
the Peace Corps training process. 
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who have been accused of such wrongdoing. In a number of these 
cases, the Bivens remedy was recognized with little or no discussion in 
support.346 The more expansive opinions are discussed below. 
Paton v. La Prade 347 was perhaps the first decision by a court of 
appeals recognizing a Bivens action in this context. Paton, a high 
school student, sued FBI agents. They had obtained Paton's name 
and address through an allegedly unconstitutional mail cover348 upon 
the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) headquarters in New York City, to 
which Paton had written pursuant to a high school course assignment .. 
The FBI agents had investigated her contact with the SWP and had 
maintained a file on her. News of the investigation had spread 
through her school, her community and to other parts of the coun-
try. 349 The court found it both "justifiable and logical"350 to imply a 
cause of action for damages to redress the infringement that Paton 
alleged.3s1 
This case was rightly decided. No special factors counselled hesi-
346. E.g., Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 648 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 
1981) (suit for money damages by charitable religious organization against postal officials, alleg-
ing interference with constitutional rights); White v. Boyle, 538 F.2d 1077, 1079 (4th Cir. 1976) 
(summary judgment against plaintiff in suit alleging retaliatory IRS investigation; availability of 
Bivens remedy recognized in dicta); Church of Scientology v. Linberg, 529 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. 
Cal. 1981) (Bivens action by church members alleging first and fourth amendment violations 
arising from FBI search and seizure operation); Grandbouche v. Adams, 529 F. Supp. 545, 548 
(D. Colo. 1982) (recognizing availability of Bivens remedy for violations of first amendment 
rights in a suit involving alleged U.S. government infiltration of association); Life Science Church 
v. IRS, 525 F. Supp. 399, 406-08 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (denying motion to dismiss damage suit based 
on alleged establishment clause violation; IRS allegedly singled out plaintiff for investigation); 
Fry v. Melaragno, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9182 at 86,306-07 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (denying 
motion to dismiss a damage claim based on allegations that IRS investigation of plaintiff's taxes 
was part of a conspiracy to deprive him of his right to speak freely in the field of tax); Lowenstein 
v. Rooney, 401 F. Supp. 952 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (suit by former congressional candidate against a 
Congressman and FBI agents for allegedly illegal investigation of plaintiff's private and political 
activities and dissemination of information thereby obtained). 
347. 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975). 
348. Pursuant to this "mail cover," each morning a postal employee would record all infor-
mation appearing on the exterior ofletters addressed to the SWP and forward the information to 
the New York FBI office. 524 F.2d at 865. 
349. 524 F.2d at 870. 
350. 524 F.2d at 870. 
351. The court reasoned that a deprivation of constitutional rights caused by a federal official 
should be as fully redressable as a deprivation caused by a state official. 524 F.2d at 870. See 
note 152 supra. To determine what types of injuries should be compensable, the court looked to 
standards developed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 524 F.2d at 871. The court found Paton's compen-
sable injuries to include the danger posed by her FBI file to her future educational and employ-
ment opportunities, adverse affects on her standing in school and in her community, and possible 
"stigmatization, invasion of privacy, interference with personality development, and interference 
with her freedom of association through the decision of others to shun her." 524 F.2d at 868, 
870-71. The difficulty of quantifying these injuries was held not to bar Paton's lawsuit. 524 F.2d 
at 871. See generally, Comment, Bringing Suit Against a Federal Officer for Money Damages: 
Extension of the Bivens Doctrine to the First and Fifth Amendments, 13 U.S.F. L. REv. 659, 671-
77 (1979). 
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tation. Nor had Congress provided an alternative remedy as effective 
as a Bivens remedy and explicitly declared to be a substitute for a Biv-
ens remedy. Indeed, Congress had passed no pertinent remedial legis-
lation at all. Plaintiff had alleged violations of her first amendment 
rights, and the court was competent to handle the litigation. Nothing 
in Bush v. Lucas or Chappell v. Wallace indicates that any different 
analysis is now appropriate. Finally, any arguments that may exist for 
denying a Bivens claim when the FBI violates the constitutional rights 
of its own agents352 are inapplicable when FBI agents violate the con-
stitutional rights of independent citizens. 
In Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 353 decided shortly after 
Paton, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia also ap-
proved a Bivens action for the victims of investigative abuses. The 
court was faced with a long list of serious allegations by American 
citizens and organizations residing in West Berlin or in the Federal 
Republic of Germany against Army officials and uniformed person-
nel. 354 Plaintiffs alleged numerous acts of warrantless electronic sur-
veillance and covert infiltration of their organizations for the purpose 
of disrupting their activities and provoking illegal acts. They also al-
leged illegal mail openings and the maintenance and dissemination of 
"dissidence identification" files, with a range of adverse conse-
quences. 355 Faced with these allegations, the court refused to dismiss 
the Bivens claim. 356 
Berlin Democratic Club should easily survive Chappell, even 
though military officials were defendants in both cases. The Court in 
Chappell found it inappropriate to afford a soldier a Bivens action 
against a superior officer because it feared "disruption of '[t]he pecu-
liar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors' "357 and 
because Congress had exercised its plenary constitutional authority 
over the military to establish "a comprehensive internal system of jus-
352. See Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 284 (1983), dis-
cussed in text following note 216 supra. 
353. 410 F. Supp. 144, 160-62 (D.D.C. 1976). 
354. Plaintiffs included the Berlin Democratic Club (which supported Senator McGovern for 
president in 1972 and the impeachment proceedings against former President Nixon) and its 
members, the Lawyers Military Defense Committee and attorneys and consultants to it, and 
American writers, journalists and ministers. 410 F. Supp. at 147. 
355. 410 F. Supp. at 147-48. 
356. 410 F. Supp. at 161. The court found the alleged injuries "too great" to go unredressed. 
The court also reasoned that only money damages could redress the injuries to plaintiffs' first 
amendment interests, interests which are at least as fundamental as the fourth amendment inter-
ests protected in Bivens. 
357. Chappel/, 103 S. Ct. at 2367 (quoting Stencil Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 
431 U.S. 666, 676 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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tice to regulate military life . . . ."358 But the plaintiffs in Berlin 
Democratic Club were civilians, not soldiers. Therefore, the unique 
disciplinary needs of the military are not implicated in Berlin Demo-
cratic Club and Congress' plenary authority over the military does not 
extend to claims by civilians against the military. 359 Furthermore, 
Congress has not enacted any remedial scheme dealing with the kind 
of constitutional violations by military officials alleged in Berlin Demo-
cratic Club. Once this military aspect of Berlin Democratic Club is 
disposed of, it becomes easy to say that the court was right to afford 
plaintiffs the opportunity to recover money damages under Bivens and 
its progeny.360 
Courts have also been right to afford prisoners Bivens actions for 
alleged violations of their first amendment 1:"ights, notwithstanding the 
special disciplinary needs in prisons. In this final group of cases where 
plaintiff's injuries were not redressable by any statutory scheme, 
courts have recognized Bivens actions361 in favor of plaintiffs who al-
leged that they were subjected to disciplinary action in retaliation for 
initiating a civil rights suit against prison officials, 362 that photographs 
had been kept from them, 363 that their access to the courts had been 
interfered with, 364 that regulations prescribing standards of hair length 
and facial hair growth were unconstitutional, 365 and that their right 
freely to exercise their religion had been violated by punishments for 
358. 103 S. Ct. at 2366. 
359. Civilian courts have entertained suits seeking injunctive relief against the military and 
military officials accused of spying, for example. E.g., Alliance to End Repression v. City of 
Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537, 551-52 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (agreed order permanently made legally 
enforceable against the Department of Defense the principle that no information shall be ac-
quired about a person or organization solely because of that person's or organization's lawful 
exercise of first amendment rights). · 
360. In so concluding, the author does not intend to be expressing any view as to the correct-
ness of the court's opinion on such matters as justiciability of the claims, personal jurisdiction 
over the defendants, standing or mootness. 
361. The reasons given for recognizing these Bivens actions have included the fundamental 
and preferred status of first amendment guarantees, the logic of Bivens applying equally to first as 
to fourth amendment claims, and the absence of policy reasons to deny such a federal remedy. 
See Jihaad v. Carlson, 410 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Mich. 1976), revd. on other grounds, 645 F.2d 
556, 558 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1981). 
362. Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1981). 
363. E.g., Trapnell v. Riggsby, 622 F.2d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 1980) (recognizing Bivens action 
where plaintiff alleged a first amendment violation in the rejection of certain photographs pursu-
ant to a prison mail regulation). 
364. Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 823 n.1 (3d Cir. 1973) (assuming, without decid-
ing, that plaintiff had stated a Bivens claim for interference with his access to the courts), cert 
denied, 419 U.S. 882 (1974). 
365. Howard v. Warden, 348 F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1972), ajfd. mem. sub nom. 
Price v. Hogan, 474 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1973) (companion case dismissed on appeal, 474 F.2d 
1341 (4th Cir. 1973)). 
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refusing to act in a manner inconsistent with their religion.366 
In Gillespie v. Civiletti, 367 a case against U.S. Marshals and various 
"John Doe" marshals, superintendents and guards, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit observed that the requirements of Carlson 
for the implication of a Bivens remedy had been met. 368 The court 
found that no congressional statute preempted a Bivens action or cre-
ated an equally effective remedy, and that there were no special factors 
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Con-
gress. 369 Unlike congressmen, U.S. marshals do not enjoy such in-
dependent status in our constitutional scheme as to suggest that 
judicially created remedies might be inappropriate, and the qualified 
immunity afforded U.S. Marshals provides them with adequate protec-
tion. 370 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a 
complaint alleging, among other things, that plaintiff was denied ac-
cess to a telephone for two and a half months, thus denying him a 
means to obtain assistance from the courts or an attorney.371 
Gillespie, and the other cases like it, should not be affected by Bush 
or Chappell Prisoners, like the rest of us, are entitled to a meaningful 
compensatory remedy when their (limited) first amendment rights are 
violated. Certainly, nothing in Bush or Chappell indicates otherwise. 
While the prison environment requires prison officials to have consid· 
erable discretion and an ability to enforce discipline upon prisoners, 
those factors are adequately reflected in the curtailment of first amend-
ment rights that prisoners suffer. 372 As evidenced by the Court's ap-
proval of a Bivens action against prison officials in Carlson v. Green, 
the lower federal courts have been correct to refuse to hold that these 
factors constitute, in addition, a special factor counselling that Bivens 
claims not be recognized. If the existence of Bivens actions has a "chil-
ling effect" upon acts that violate prisoners' constitutional rights, that 
366. Chapman v. Pickett, 586 F.2d 22, 26 (7th Cir. 1978) (implicitly recognizing Bivens ac-
tion where plaintilf complained of punitive segregation for his refusal to handle pork, an act 
prohibited by his religion); Jihaad v. Carlson, 410 F. Supp. 1132, 1134-35 (E.D. Mich. 1976) 
(sustaining complaint tbat placing inmate in disciplinary segregation for refusing to shave oft' a 
beard required by his religious beliefs and giving him only pork sandwiches and oranges to eat 
while he was so segregated, when his religion proscribed the eating of pork, violated his right 
freely to exercise his religion), revd. on other grounds, sub nom. Jihaad v. O'Brien, 645 F.2d 556 
(6tb Cir. 1981). 
367. 629 F.2d 637 (9tb Cir. 1980). 
368. 629 F.2d at 639, 642. 
369. 629 F.2d at 642. 
370. 629 F.2d at 642. 
371. 629 F.2d at 642. 
372. See Jones v. North Carolina Pnsoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125-26, 129-33 
(1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). 
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ought not to create great concern. 373 In the absence of adequate statu-
tory remedies, the Bill of Rights requires that a money damage remedy 
under the Constitution be afforded. 
CONCLUSION 
Civil actions through which federal officials may be held liable for 
their constitutional transgressions have become an important means of 
safeguarding and vindicating our constitutional rights. While it had 
, been said since the genesis of Bivens actions that in some circum-
stances the courts ought to refrain from implying such a cause of ac-
tion arising directly under the Constitution, until the 1983 Term the 
Supreme Court had never found to be present in a case circumstances 
that defeated a Bivens action. In Chappell v. Wallace and Bush v. Lu-
cas the Court found such circumstances to be present. As this Article 
has demonstrated, it did so only by departing from the line of analysis 
that its previous cases had established and by raising the barriers to 
recovery of money damages under the Constitution. Most impor-
tantly, perhaps, the Court failed in Chappell and Bush to underscore 
the need for courts to assess the constitutional adequacy of legislative 1 
remedial schemes before relying on those alternative remedies to de-
feat implication of a Bivens action. · 
This Article argues that it is the responsibility of the judiciary to 
ensure that legislated remedies for constitutional violations meet con-
stitutional minima. The courts should decide whether a statutory 
scheme was intended by Congress to substitute for a Bivens action. If 
it was not so intended, then a Bivens remedy may be afforded, absent 
special factors counselling hesitation. If it was so intended, the courts 
must resolve additional questions. Does the legislated remedy speak 
to the violation suffered: does it afford retrospective relief for past vio-
lations and prospective relief if future violations are sufficiently 
threatened? Is the legislated remedy adequate for this plaintiff, how-
ever useful it may be for persons differently situated? Has the plaintiff 
meaningful access to the legislated remedies? Are the available reme-
dies truly. compensatory, not merely symbolic? Is the Bivens remedy 
indispensable in the sense that no other remedial scheme can prevent 
the substantive constitutional requirements from becoming a "mere 
form of words"? The Supreme Court needs to articulate further stan-
dards for determining whether congressional remedies are constitu-
tionally adequate. 
In its second part, the Article argues generally in favor of the crea-
373. Prison officials would be protected by qualified immunity. See text at notes 41-42supra. 
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tion of Bivens actions to vindicate first amendment rights. It then 
demonstrates by reference to several recent cases that the Court's deci-
sions in Chappell and Bush have increased the risk that constitutional 
rights, and first amendment rights in particular, will be inadequately 
enforceable. Finally, the Article identifies the kinds of first amendment 
Bivens cases that should remain largely unaffected by Chappell and 
Bush. Many of the decided cases are faithful to the analysis previously 
prescribed by the Supreme Court, and are appropriately solicitous of 
first amendment interests. 
As Bivens cases continue to be brought, it is hoped that this Article 
will help to guide the courts to a proper resolution of the issues posed. 
Only heightened sensitivity by the judiciary to its responsibility to en-
sure that legislated remedies are adequate will enable litigants to vindi-
cate their constitutional rights, rather than be left with an empty 
promise. 
